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BEN DEPOORTER* AND SVEN VANNESTE**

Norms and Enforcement: The Case

Against Copyright Litigation
n the past few years, we have witnessed a historical shift in the
enforcement of copyright law. While copyright enforcement
against private copying traditionally centered on commercial intermediaries and piracy, content owners now also pursue infringement actions against consumers and private copiers
directly. While consumers of pirated content have traditionally
been captured indirectly through taxes or blanket licenses, they
are now subjected to a mass litigation campaign.
Despite the wide media attention and spectacular headlines,
litigation has produced only limited results in the present era of
digital downloading and peer-to-peer (or "P2P") file swapping.
Lawsuits against private copiers have not halted file-sharing activities. An ever-increasing number of unlicensed downloads are
taking place in private homes all over the world. According to
recent data, over twelve million people' are simultaneously sharing 1.08 billion music, movie, and software files on the Internet at
any given moment.2
Why are individuals unresponsive to the increased costs of
* Professor of Law, Ghent University; Visiting Professor, George Mason University School of Law (Fall 2005); J.D., Ph.d., Ghent University; M.A., University of
Hamburg; LL.M, Yale Law School. Earlier drafts of this paper were presented in
workshops at Boston University School of Law, George Mason University School of
Law, University of Bologna, the University of Miami School of Law, the Univiversity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and Ghent University. The participants at each
of these presentations are gratefully acknowledged for their comments. For their
discussion and suggestions, I express my gratitude to Bruce Kobayashi, Bruce Johnson, Wendy Gordon, Francesco Parisi, Jef Demot, Brett Frischmann, Jackie Gehring,
Rob Schuwerk, and Michael Meurer. All remaining errors are, of course, our own.
** Ghent University, Department of Developmental, Personality & Social
Psychology.
1 Statistical data last updated on January 24, 2006. See P2P Info Centre, P2P Networks Statistics, http://p2p.info.pl/eng/users-general.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
2 See P2P Info Centre, P2P Networks Statistics, http://p2p.info.pl/eng/files-general.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
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downloading unlicensed music? One possible reason is that individuals simply believe that the chances of being caught are too
remote because there are so many people downloading at any

given moment in time. Downloading fell temporarily during the
initial wave of lawsuits but increased again during subsequent
rounds of lawsuits as file swappers updated their estimation of
the chances of getting caught.3

Notwithstanding the limited deterrent effect of lawsuits on file
sharing, record industry representatives, who often refer to law-

suits in terms of "educating" the public on copyright law, 4 have
announced that they will continue to pursue litigation against individual file swappers. In this Article, we suggest that if litigation
indeed serves purposes other than deterrence, legal sanctions are
unlikely to alter the social meaning and legitimacy of peer-topeer networks and file sharing. Because of a convinced belief
among copyright users that file sharing should be legal, copyright
enforcement is challenged by a social norm complication. Drawing on socio-psychological literature and new data from an empirical study, we posit that copyright litigation faces an
impossibility theorem: lawsuits against file sharers cannot simultaneously achieve effective deterrence and promote procopyright
norms.
Part I provides an overview of recent copyright litigation
against copyright infringers on file-sharing networks. In Part II,
3 For instance, the number of people on Kazaa's FastTrack network fell over the
summer of 2003 but grew to 5.6 million simultaneous users in October 2003. John
Borland, RIAA Lawsuits Yield Mixed Results, CNET NEWS.COM, Dec. 4, 2003,
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5113188.html.
Other studies reported a twentyseven percent increase from December 2002 to March 2003. Dawn Kawamoto,
Downloads Rise as File TradersSeek New Venues, CNET NEWS.COM, Apr. 26, 2004,
http://news.com.com/2100-1027_3-5199901.htm.
The number of self-reported
downloaded music files increased to 23 million in April 2003, rising from 18 million
between November and December 2002, according to a study released by the Pew
Internet & American Life Project. Id. Studies report a move away from the most
popular and most highly monitored file-sharing networks to low-profile platforms,
such as iMesh, BitTorrent, and eMule. Id. "BigChampagne, which tracks Internet
file sharing, says 8.3 million people were online at any one time in June using unauthorized services like Kazaa and eDonkey-up 19% from 6.8 million in June 2003."
Jefferson Graham, Online File Swapping Endures, USA TODAY, July 11, 2004, at
1A.
4 Consider in this regard the rhetorical strategy of record labels to equate file
sharing with stealing in copyright warnings on CDs and movie trailers and to refer to
file sharers as "Internet Thieves." See, e.g., Press Release, Recording Indus. Assoc.
of Am., Music Industry Targets 765 Internet Thieves in New Round of Lawsuits
(July 28, 2005), available at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/ 072805.asp.
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we apply the rational choice paradigm to litigation of private
copying and complement it with norm-based approaches.
Part III examines behavioral adjustments and social norms effects in a scenario study where students are subjected to varying
modalities of copyright law enforcement. The aim of the study is
to investigate the effect of copyright law enforcement on anticopyright norms among file swappers on peer-to-peer networks
and to examine differences between experienced users of filesharing technologies and individuals who have not (yet) engaged
in file sharing.
The evidence from our study raises the hypothesis that deterrence and norms work at cross-purposes. Experienced users of
peer-to-peer technology have internalized an anticopyright norm
that cannot be unraveled through enforcement. Anticopyright
norms of file swapppers are strengthened when the level of copyright enforcement increases, which results in more downloading
whenever enforcement is temporarily suspended. Enforcement
has an ambivalent effect on individuals who have no experience
with file sharing. Severe sanctions do not have a counterproductive effect on copyright norms of such "non-file sharers," yet exposure to information on copyright enforcement against peer-topeer software reinforces the belief or expectation that others are
downloading.
Part IV reflects on the lessons learned from the study, in particular with regard to the policy choices that regulators, courts,
and copyright-dependent industries face when approaching the
widespread use of copyrighted material on file-sharing networks.
These options, including criminal prosecutions of digital piracy,
copyright education, self-help strategies, and collective licensing,
are evaluated in light of the interaction of deterrence and anticopyright norms. We will argue that social norm backlash is
particularly relevant for copyright law because circumvention
technology and the so-called technological "arms race" between
content holders and pirates inevitably create lapses in copyright
enforcement. During these intervals of reduced enforcement,
conduct is determined by norms.
Finally, Part V considers the recent decision by the Supreme
Court in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., which held that
producers of file-sharing applications can potentially be held ac-
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countable for distributing software.5 Because Grokster focuses
on the commercial intent of P2P producers, it is doubtful that the
decision will be an effective tool in reducing the availability of
file-sharing technology. As digital technology becomes more de-

centralized, it is increasingly judgment-proof. File-sharing applications are produced in user-driven innovation environments
that operate without centralized, residual claimants. Life cycles
of software applications extend beyond the legal and financial
status of their creators. This suggests that we have only seen the

tip of the iceberg with regard to lawsuits against private copiers.
We use copyright enforcement as a case study for the interaction between law enforcement and norms in general. The literature on social norms suggests that when legal sanctions violate

the subjective conception of behavior that is being punished, individuals respond differently when that enforcement coincides

with preexisting notions of what is just or appropriate. Although
some studies have investigated the conflict of deterrence and

norms with regard to tax evasion,6 the dynamics of social norms
and law enforcement remain poorly understood. This Article addresses several gaps in the existing literature. While there is an

abundance of theoretical attention to social norms, there is little
empirical data on the interaction between norms and law enforcement. 7 Also, this Article supplements the limited literature
on enforcement patterns in copyright law.8
5 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster II1), 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
6 Several studies report an undermining effect of internalized norms against tax
evasion on tax law deterrence. See, e.g., John S. Caroll, A PsychologicalApproach
to Deterrence: The Evaluation of Crime Opportunities, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1512 (1978); Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment,
Social Dissaproval and Internalizationas Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325 (1980); Kent W. Smith, Integrating Three Perspectives on
Noncompliance: A Sequential Decision Model, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 350 (1990).
7 The few available studies deal with the dynamics of social norms with regard to
tax evasion. E.g., James Alm, et al., Changing the Social Norm of Tax Compliance
by Voting, 52 KYKLOS 141 (1999); Ana DeJuan, et al., Voluntary Tax Compliant Behavior of Spanish Income Tax Payers, 49 PUBL. FIN. 90 (1994); Michael Wenzel, The
Social Side of Sanctions: Personaland Social Norms as Moderatorsof Deterrence, 28
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 547 (2004). A few concern criminal behavior. E.g., SALLY S.
SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL

(2002); Ronet Bachman,

et al., The Rationality of Sexual Offending: Testing a Deterrence/Rational Choice
Conception of Sexual Assault, 26 L. & Soc'Y REV. 343 (1992).
8 Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679 (2003). "While many authors discuss the challenge of new technology for intellectual property laws, it is
difficult to find academic work on actual patterns of enforcement." Id. at 713 n.106.
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I
LITIGATION OF PRIVATE COPYING

Historically, commercial sellers of unlicensed content have always been targets at the forefront of copyright law enforcement. 9
The principle targets are commercial agents or "pirates" who sell
bootlegs of live recordings and unlicensed software distributors

who sell pirated versions of CDs and video games."° Similarly, in
the digital era, legal claims were mainly directed at commercial

intermediaries, such as for-profit Web stores or providers of
novel Internet services, that reproduced music. 1 Despite a num-

ber of early legal successes against commercial intermediaries
9

JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 111 (2001) ("Our copyright laws have,
until now, focused primarily on the relationships among those who write works of
authorship and disseminate those works to the public."); Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting
Cars on the "Information Superhighway": Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in
Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1488 (1995); Wu, supra note 8, at 713-14
("Copyright owners have traditionally avoided targeting end users of copyrighted
works ....
One is pressed to find any example of copyright law being enforced
against individuals for home copying (as opposed to commercial activity) prior to
1990.").
10 See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996)
(contributory liability imposed on defendant who operated a swap meet where many
of the vendors sold counterfeit goods); Arista Records, Inc. v. Mp3Board, Inc., No.
00 Civ. 4660(SHS), 2002 Westlaw 1997918, at *6, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002) (record
companies brought action against Internet site operator that provided links to pirated copies of copyrighted musical recordings); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Computer
& Entm't, Inc., No. C96-0187, 1996 U.S. Dist. Westlaw 511619, at *4 (W.D. Wash.
May 31, 1996) (defendant sold video game duplication devices for Nintendo game
cartridges); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (defendant made available unauthorized copies of Sega games on a fee-based Internet
bulletin board). See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L.
REV. 731 (2003) (explaining the distinctions between commercial piracy and noncommercial personal infringement).
11 For instance, record companies won a copyright suit against MP3.com, which
allowed subscribers to play music that they owned, borrowed, or had previously purchased over the Internet. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d
349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The court did not uphold the defense's argument that the
service of MP3.com merely allowed subscribers to "space shift" sound recordings
that they owned without carrying around physical CDs because the service was
neither transformative nor productive. See id. at 351. According to the court, the
use of a different medium did not render the use transformative. Id.; see also Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting the fair
use defense by the operator of a service that retransmitted copyrighted radio broadcasts over telephone lines); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l, Ltd., 149
F.3d 987, 994-95 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the fair use defense by television news
agencies that copied copyrighted news footage and retransmitted it to news
organizations).
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that "facilitated" online copyright infringements, most notably in
the Napster 12 and Aimster"3 cases, the content industry was unable to preempt further copyright infringements on many other
technological platforms. While incurring important losses in
RIAA v. Verizon 14 and MGM v. Grokster,'5 the increasing scale
of copyright infringements led the entertainment industry to redirect its focus and to target direct copyright offenders on peerto-peer file-sharing applications.
In September 2003, the Recording Industry Association of

America (RIAA) began sending subpoenas to Internet service
providers, demanding the names of users who were allegedly

downloading music on file-sharing networks.

The lawsuits

targeted individuals who stored large amounts of music files in

publicly accessible folders on their computers. This first wave of
cases came as a surprise to some, and despite negative reactions

within and outside the file-sharing community, file-sharing activities declined sharply. 1 6 These cases settled, on average, for 1500
dollars.1 7 Despite a few errors and public relations disasters, 18
12 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster H), 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
A preliminary injunction enjoined Napster from "engaging in, or facilitating others
in the copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs' copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings, protected by either federal or
state law, without express permission of the rights owner." A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc. (Napster 1); 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2000). The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part the district court's decision. Napster
II, 239 F.3d at 1011, 1029 (finding contributory infringement because Napster facilitated its users' direct infringement despite its actual knowledge of the infringing
materials on its system and finding against fair use because of the commercial losses
to the digital market of legal downloads of music).
13 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
14 Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. (RIAA) v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc.,
351 F.3d 1229 (D.D.C. 2003). In RIAA, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia overturned a lower court ruling that required Verizon to reveal the identities of subscribers suspected of illegally exchanging copyrighted songs. Although
materials actually hosted by an ISP (such as information stored on Verizon's servers)
can be subpoenaed with form subpoenas, the court held that the provision does not
apply to instances in which the ISP merely acts as a conduit for peer-to-peer exchanges, such as with e-mail and instant messages. Id. at 1237. As a result of this
ruling, the RIAA must now go through the court system to learn the identities of
alleged copyright infringers.
15 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd (Grokster I), 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
Cal. 2003). For a discussion of this decision and its aftermath, see infra Part V.
16 See supra note 3.
17 This average gradually increased to $3000. Paul Roberts, RIAA Sues 532 'John
Does', PC WORLD, August 18, 2005, availableat http://www.pcworld.com/news/ article/0,aid,l14387,00.asp.
18 One such disaster was a lawsuit accusing an eighty-three-year-old woman who
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the results encouraged the RIAA, and it followed up with a second wave of lawsuits. In October 2003, the RIAA initiated
eighty additional lawsuits against individual peer-to-peer file
sharers.' 9 But the deterrent effect did not last. By March 2003,
overall downloading began to rise again, and by the end of that
same year, file sharing had exceeded the levels at which it had
occurred prior to the start of the RIAA's litigation efforts.2 0
Overall, the RIAA made good on its promise to engage file
swappers with a steady stream of lawsuits. 2' Since September
2003, the recording industry has issued over 3400 individual lawsuits against users of peer-to-peer file-sharing technology.22 The
industry has announced that it will continue this trend.2 3 Most

recently, the RIAA narrowed its focus by targeting geographical
areas 242-and specific university networks.2 5
Meanwhile, the Motion Picture Association of America
(MPAA) has joined the fray. 26 Because the amount of motion
pictures being exchanged over peer-to-peer networks had increased dramatically in 2004, mainly due to increased broadband
width and improved compression technologies,2 7 the movie inhad died over a month earlier of making more than 700 songs available on the Internet. Andrew Orlowski, RIAA Sues the Dead, THE REGISTER, Feb. 5, 2005, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/05/riaa-sues-the-dead/.
Or take the
lawsuit against a twelve-year-old New York girl, Brianna LaHara, whose mother
lived in a New York City Housing Authority apartment for low to moderate income
levels. See John Borland, RIAA Settles with 12-Year-Old Girl, CNET NEWS.COM,
Sept. 9, 2003, http://news.com.com/2102-1027 3-5073717.html?tag=st.util.print.
19 RIAA Launches Second Wave of File-Swapper Suits, OUT-LAw NEWS, Oct. 31,
2003, http://www.out-law.com/page-4029.
20 See supra note 3.
21 RIAA Blasts 754 New Lawsuits, Legal Assault Relentless, DIGITAL Music
NEWS, Dec. 17, 2004, http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/yesterday/december2004#
121704riaa.
22 File Sharing Goes to High Court, WIRED NEWS, Dec. 10, 2004, http://
www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,65995,00.html; see also RIAA Launches Second Wave of File-Swapper Suits, supra note 19.
23 See Press Release, Recording Indus. Assoc. of Am., supra note 4.
24 In South Carolina, subpoenas were issued against seven suspected music file
swappers. See RIAA Launches Strategic Strike, Sues Seven in South Carolina,DIGITAL Music NEWS, Apr. 6, 2005, http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/yesterday/april

2005#040605riaa.
25 It sued several users who used the i2hub high-speed university networks at universities including Columbia and Princeton to share music files. Id.
26 See, e.g., Press Release, Motion Picture Assoc. of Am. (MPAA), Motion Picture industry Takes Action Against Indiana Internet Thief (Jan. 27, 2006), available
at http://www.mpaa.org/PresReleases.asp. This Web site contains numerous press
releases regarding the MPAA's actions against file sharers.
27 "[BitTorrent] is optimized to handle massive files with ease by compiling whole
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dustry group could no longer sit back. In November 2004, the
MPAA launched a first wave of lawsuits against individuals who
had allegedly shared substantial numbers of movies. 28 By June

2005, the MPAA had initiated five rounds of lawsuits against individual file traders.2 9

At first sight, it seems that the litigation strategy is showing
some results. Industry groups point to decreased downloading
on targeted networks such as Kazaa3 ° and the success of licensed
music sites such as iTunes.3 1 A close look at these studies, how-

ever, reveals a more complex picture of file-sharing activities and
litigation awareness. First, these surveys have become more vulnerable to underreporting because of heightened awareness of
copyright issues among respondents.3 2 Second, studies of overall

Web traffic indicate an overall increase in downloading.33 For
instance, according to data from peer-to-peer tracking firm
BigChampagne, the number of average simultaneous file sharers

increased by more than two million in 2004 to reach a simultanefiles from distributed bits. Those bits, also referred to as seed files, are assembled
on-the-fly by BitTorrent, enabling a rapid transfer of files that would otherwise
choke systems if files were swallowed whole." BitTorrent Prolongs the Hollywood
Headache, DIGITAL Music NEWS, Dec. 13, 2004, http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/
yesterday/december2004#121304bittorrent.
28
Hollywood Sues Alleged File Swappers, MSNBC, Nov. 16, 2004, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6504024/.
29
See Press Release, MPAA, Movie Studios vs. Internet Movie Thieves, Round
Five! (June 2, 2005), available at http://www.mpaa.org/press-releases/2005_06_02b.
doc.
30 According to a recent study by comScore Media Metrix, unique visitors to the
Kazaa Media Desktop have sunk seventy-one percent over the past year. Kazaa
Faces Serious User Decline, P2P Picture Cloudy, DIGITAL Music NEWS, Mar. 31,
2005, http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/yesterday/march2005#033005kazaa.
31 See Tony Smith, U.S. Legal Music Downloads Up 187%, THE REGISTER, July

14, 2005, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/07/14/us_music downloads/ (U.S. music
downloaders paid for 158 million songs during the first six months of 2005-almost
three times the number of songs acquired legally in 2004).
32 Jon Bonn6, Big Drop Seen in Music Downloads, MSNBC, Jan. 4, 2004, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3860823/; Thomas Mennecke, Pew Internet's File-Sharing
and P2P Study, SLYCK, Mar. 26, 2005, http://www.slyck.com/ news.php?story=721.
33 Firms specializing in tracking peer-to-peer software, such as BigChampagne
and BayTSP, claim that file sharing usage has remained steady over the past year.
Bonn6, supra note 32. Similarly, according to a wide survey of 50,000 Europeans
recently published by Music Choice, downloading is booming in Europe. Fifty percent of the European respondents regularly download music from the Internet;
France (eighty percent) and Norway (half of Norway's respondents download
twenty tracks per month) lead the pack. Ninety percent of the respondents believe
that CDs are too expensive. Press Release, Music Choice, Virtual Music Collections
Increase as 90% of Europeans Claim CDs are too Expensive (Nov. 30, 2004), available at http://partners.musicchoice.co.uk/mediacentre/release.aspx?r=7.
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ous usage figure that is approaching six million files.3 4 This might
be explained by the fact that users are switching to file-sharing
platforms, mainly BitTorrent, 3- and alternative methods to obtain music files (e-mail, instant messaging, downloading from
each others' MP3 players, etc.), 36 with overall file-sharing levels
rising.
Although the mass litigation of private copying alters the historical balance of copyright law enforcement, it seems that record companies and music publishers have not managed to
reverse the trend toward file sharing and copyright circumvention. Meanwhile, the entertainment industry shows no signs of
abandoning its litigation strategy.3 7 In the following Part, we
draw on economic and socio-psychological literature to analyze
the effects of lawsuits against private copiers. As will be argued,
the interaction between deterrence- and norm-based variables
provides insight into the ineffectiveness of copyright litigation
and the unlikely promise of altering anticopyright norms through
litigation. In Part Ill, we test these predictions in a new study.
C

II
Two

MODELS OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT:

INCENTIVES VERSUS INTUITION

Two different models explain why and when people obey the
law. Under the instrumental economic approach, individuals refrain from unlawful behavior because the costs of the unlawful
behavior are higher than the benefits, while in the normative
conception, individuals are law abiding because they believe the
law is just. We examine both propositions in light of copyright
infringing behavior.
34 Kazaa Faces Serious User Decline, P2P Picture Cloudy, supra note 30.

35 According to a recent study conducted by the tracking firm CacheLogic, the
BitTorrent peer-to-peer service continues to grow, consuming about half of all filesharing traffic volume at the close of 2004. See Films "Fuel Online File-Sharing,"
BBC NEWS, July 15,

2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/technology/

3890527.stm.
36 Mennecke, supra note 32.
37 The movie industry joined the fray in November 2004 when the MPAA filed a
first round of lawsuits. See Katie Dean, Movie Studios Sue File Traders, WIRED
NEWS, Nov. 17, 2004, http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,65730,00.html
("'I don't understand why (the MPAA) is doing this,' said Jason Schultz, an attorney
with the Electronic Frontier Foundation. 'It doesn't make any sense. It hasn't
worked for the RIAA."').
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Rational Copyright Infringers

According to the instrumental economic model, individuals
comply with legal rules because they fear the consequences of
failing to do so. Because the behavior of individuals is determined by the costs and benefits of their actions, law can serve as
a deterrent since the formal sanction of the law and its likelihood
38
are factors that increase the costs of unlawful behavior.
Ideally, liability should be set equal to the damage suffered by
the victim of the infringing act. 39 An individual contemplating
file sharing on peer-to-peer networks will engage in such activities only when the expected benefits to him or her exceed the
expected cost.
Once the appropriate level of punishment cost is set, one must
approach a combination of severity and certainty of liability that
will effectively impose that cost on the would-be copyright offender. For instance, an expected liability cost of $1000 can be
imposed by combining a fine of $1000 with a probability of apprehension and convicion of 1. A fine of $10,000 can be combined with a probability of 0.1. Likewise, a remedy of $1,000,000
can be combined with a probability of 0.001, and so forth.4 0
Economic theory requires that the optimal penalty equals the
social cost of copyright infringement divided by the probability
that liability will be imposed. Suppose that the social cost from
obtaining a popular song from someone's file-sharing directory is
$10,000 (the album does not make a profit and record labels invest less in music, reducing the overall creation and dissipation of
music of this genre). If, from a cost-benefit perspective, the optimal expenditure on apprehension and conviction results in a one
percent probability of apprehension and conviction, the optimal
liability for copyright infringement of this sort will be
38 See generally George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL.

ECON. 526 (1970) (constructing a theory of rational law enforcement).
39 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed.

1998) (explaining fundamental concepts of the economic approach to law).
40 Id. at 244. If the costs of collecting remedies were zero regardless of the type of
infringement or the size of the remedy, the most efficient combination would be a
very low probability and a very low fine. This result occurs because the increase of
the fine is costless, the costs of enforcement are reduced, and expected liability costs
remain equal. This fundamental insight follows from the seminal work of Gary S.
Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169

(1968). See generally Isaac Erlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 259 (1972) (exploring analytical and empirical framework of
deterrent effect of law enforcement).
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$1,000,000.41

Such is the vintage cost-benefit approach to enforcing direct
copyright infringements. A clear-cut welfare analysis, however,
is complicated by several factors.
First, due to the broad scale of infringements and geographical
and technical limitations, the rate of punishment for copyright
offenses is very low. This is one of the main arguments that supported the tradition of enforcing private copying against commercial intermediaries.
Second, the private costs from copyright infringements are uncertain and heavily contested. 42 The record industry claims that
damages are in the billions of dollars.4 3 Skeptics argue that the
decline in CD revenues results from changing consumer patterns
(increased expenditures on consumer electronics, mobile phone
technology, DVDs, etc.) as well as unlicensed downloading.
Also, the total number of downloads on peer-to-peer networks
are a poor proxy for lost sales because a large percentage of
downloaded songs would not otherwise have been purchased by
file sharers.44
Third, the social costs of downloading are even harder to measure. This complicates an economic analysis of peer-to-peer file
sharing because setting efficient damage remedies requires an assessment of social damages. Social damages from copyright infringements are ambivalent. The costs of such infringement
require an assessment of private damages (loss of income for artists and publishers) as well as an estimation of the dynamic costs
of a reduction of investments in the production of cultural goods
41 This would require that enforcers spend an extra unit on discovery and prosecution as long as the marginal costs are lower than the marginal benefits derived from
the enforcement activity.
42 Some studies contest the claim that file sharing has a negative impact on the
music industry. See, e.g., FELIX OBERHOLZER & KOLEMAN STRUMPF, THE EFFECT

(2004), available at
http://www.unc.edu/-cigar/papers/FileSharing-March2004.pdf (finding that file sharing boosts record sales); Andy McCue, Study: Falling CD Sales Can't Be Blamed on
P2P, CNET NEWS.COM, June 14, 2005, http://businessweek-cnet.com.com/
Study+Falling+CD§ales©antfe£1amed+on+P2P/2100-1027_3-5746291.html (discussing study that found that file sharing has no negative impact on CD sales).
43 See, e.g., Third Party Research: Illegal File Sharing and PurchasingHabits, INT'L
FED. OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., Nov. 15, 2005, http://www.ifpi.org/site-conOF FILE SHARING ON RECORD SALES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

tent/press/20051115a.html (citing Informa Media Group estimate of $2.1 billion in
potential industry losses due to file sharing).
44

See
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such as music. Here, the picture becomes murky. Because incentive effects are hard to measure, economic analysis has little
definitive knowledge on this matter.4a This is especially the case
with intellectual creations because (1) many artists create from
an endogenous desire rather than external motivations and (2)
the financial incentives derived from copyright royalties are often
46
insignificant compared to other sources of revenue for artists
such as live performances, derivative works, endorsements, and
new Internet-based products.4 7
These issues are tremendously challenging research questions
to social scientists but leave a public interest regulator awash in
uncertainty. Why do current statutory copyright remedies fail to
deter file swappers adequately? How does one assess the inconclusive evidence on private and social damages of peer-to-peer
file sharing? Does economic theory provide support for increasing punishments of private copying (as recent legislation contemplates)?4 8 Do lawsuits, even when not effective at deterring
behavior, signal social values and influence the social meaning
and preferences of individuals? There is an intuitive understanding that enforcing copyright law can be counterproductive in
some circumstances. But what exactly are the limits to statutory
remedies given the dangers of a fallout between the norms regarding private copying and copyright law?
As we argue below, these questions cannot be answered without taking into account the social-psychological processes involved in the enforcement of copyright law. Next, we discuss the
effect of norms and psychological factors from a theoretical perspective. In Part III, we examine these issues in a scenario study.

45 For a discussion on the limits of economic theory's ability to provide decisive
answers to social welfare issues with regard to intellectual property law, see George
L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property:Comment
on Cheung, 8 REs. L. & ECON. 19, 21-24 (1986).
46 Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright:Napster and the
New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268 (2002) ("[I]n
light of alternative methods for funding musicians, including statutory levies, denying the public access to music can no longer be justified as a necessary or desirable
means for encouraging the creation of music.").
47 Id. at 308-11. See generally JEFFREY BRABEC & TODD BRABEC, MUSIC,
MONEY, AND SUCCESS (2d ed. 2000) (listing the available sources of income to
artists).
48 See infra Part V.
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B.

Law Enforcement and Norms Obstruction

Scholars increasingly integrate economic explanations of unlawful conduct with norm-based accounts of behavior.4 9 Social
psychologists provide evidence that legal obedience is "moralitybased" and/or "legitimacy-based." 5 People's interaction with
law thus depends largely on whether they believe that the law is
"just" and/or produced by a legitimate regulator.5 ' Recent litera-

ture in the fields of sociology, psychology, and economics reinforces the notion that the effectiveness of law enforcement is
influenced by preexisting beliefs and norms as well as by the private costs and benefits of the behavior itself.5 2 Empirical research on legitimacy reveals that norm-based factors are
sometimes stronger determinants of behavior than formal sanctions.53 These studies emphasize the importance of legitimacy to
legal obedience above and beyond deterrence. 54
The flipside of this coin is that people obey a law less when it is

considered "unjust" or when a lawmaker is perceived as "illegitimate." Bringing together the deterrence- and norm-based models, this implies that even when it is irrational from a narrow costbenefit perspective, certain unlawful behavior will occur simply

because the underlying law conflicts with preexisting notions of
what is just and legitimate. In fact, if an underlying law conflicts
with a morality- or legitimacy-based intuition, violating an unjust
49 See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR.
L. REV. 391 (2000).
50 For instance, in the context of tax compliance, there is extensive literature on
the assumption that "social motivations rather than mere selfishness ... affect taxpaying behaviour, such as ethical concerns and social norms, perceptions of fairness
and legitimacy." Michael Wenzel, Motivation or Rationalisation?Causal Relations
Between Ethics, Norms and Tax Compliance, 26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 491, 492 (2005)
(citing TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990)); see also John S. Carroll, Compliance with the Law: A Decision-Making Approach to Taxpaying, 11 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 319, 319-35 (1987) (applying decision-making models to tax law);
Simon James, et al., Developing a Tax Compliance Strategy for Revenue Services, 55
BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 158-64 (2001).
51 TYLER, supra note 50, at 3-4.
52 Id. at 54-60. These studies have examined compliance with arbitration awards
and business decisions. See Tracey L. Meares, Signaling, Legitimacy, and Compliance: A Comment on Posner's Law and Social Norms and Criminal Law Policy, 36
U. RICH. L. REV. 407, 410 & nn.27-28 (2002).
53 A number of empirical studies find that norms and beliefs are a stronger determinant of compliance than deterrence. See, e.g., Alm, et al., supra note 7; DeJuan,
et al., supra note 7; Wenzel, supra note 7.
54
For an overview, see Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and
Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453 (2003).
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or immoral law might increase utility. The overlap between rational choice- and norm-based accounts raises the hypothesis that
norms and deterrence might work at cross-purposes.
An additional effect of norms might be at work in undercutting
compliance with copyright law. Given that norms are hard to
dislodge,5 5 imposing laws that are perceived as unjust or illegitimate might strengthen the underlying opposition against those
laws. Recent scholarship points to the problematic nature of vig-

orous legal condemnations of norms in these settings, noting that
the interaction of law and social norms often strengthens the preexisting antisocial norm.56 Perhaps such countervailing norm effects might explain file swappers' continued persistence in spite

of increased enforcement efforts by content holders.
Several studies have documented the emergence of anticopyright culture and the strong norm component of downloading and file sharing. 57 Many users of peer-to-peer applications
55 Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609 (1998); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and
Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan,
Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 805 (1998).
56 For a theoretical model, see Francesco Parisi & Georg Von Wangenheim, Legislation and CountervailingEffects from Social Norms (George Mason Univ. Sch. of
Law, Law and Economics Working Paper Series No. 04-31, 2004), availableat http://
www.gmu.edu/departments/law/faculty/papers/docs/04-31.pdf (describing a cycle of
opinion formation whereby public acts of disobedience and protest undermine the
legitimacy of legislation, which leads to further opposition).
57 Several studies have documented the emergence of anticopyright culture and
the strong norm component of downloading and file sharing. See, e.g., Daniel J.
Gervais, The Price of Social Norms: Toward a Liability Regime for File-Sharing, 12
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39 (2004); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social
Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA.
L. REV. 505 (2003) (computer code may solve collective action problems). The definition of "social norm" is somewhat illusive. For the purpose at hand, we side with
the notion that a social norm is a "social regularity"-a behavior that is in fact
widely adopted in society because it is not merely what people do but also because it
corresponds with a normative conception within society, or a subgroup thereof, of
what people should do. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997). Where necessary, we will distinguish between personal norms (moral standards attributed to an individual) and social norms (standards attributed to a group or collective). See Michael Wenzel, An
Analysis of Norm Processes in Tax Compliance, 25 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 213 (2004).
As we will see, however, the distinction between both categories loses some relevance because (1) generally, social norms are often internalized, and (2) in our results, perhaps through a self-serving bias, the social norm evaluation of respondents
correlates with personal norms. Differences between personal and social norms,
however, are highly relevant to policy recommendations. Recent literature provides
insightful theoretical and empirical insights into the origins of social norms. See infra Part III.
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operate from a metanorm that file-sharing technology is wealth
maximizing and that copyright law is out of date or biased toward
music publishers. In this view, file sharing is to "be embraced
rather than feared""8 because "technology makes it possible to
make an unlimited number of perfect copies"5 9 and distribute
those copies to millions of users "at no cost to the content
provider."6 0
The norms among young people ages thirteen to seventeen are
strikingly anticopyright. Prior to the litigation of individual file
sharers, only twenty percent of teenagers ages seventeen and
under believed that it was "wrong" to download music files without permission from authors compared to forty-eight percent of
the thirty-five to fifty-four age group and sixty-three percent for
ages above fifty-five years (see Table 1). These results are confirmed by a Gallup Poll that indicates that eighty-three percent of
teenagers ages thirteen to seventeen believe.that sharing digital
music is morally acceptable.6 1
Such anticopyright norms are in conflict with the conventional
business model of copyright law, but these norms, of course, conform within a file-sharing subculture. Witness in this regard the
ability of the file-sharing community to maintain a social norm of
sharing files on peer-to-peer networks. The exclusive focus of
lawsuits on shared files 62 indirectly targets this collective action
rule among file sharers ("Please share your own files if you want
to download files from others"). Despite the possible costs associated with sharing files and the incentive for free riding, many
people deliberately leave files in a shared folder. None of the
existing theories on social norms provide an explanation for this
behavior. Because of the degree of anonymity and the lack of
repeat interactions, 63 sharing songs online offers only very limited opportunities for indicating that one is worthy of trust

64

or

58 Ku, supra note 46, at 268.
59 Id. at 264.
60 Id. at 268.
61 THE GALLUP POLL, DOWNLOADS ARE MUSIC TO TEEN EARS (June 24, 2003)

(on file with author), available at http://www.poll.gallup.com.
62 For technical reasons, the availability of files on file-sharing networks is easier
to detect than the act of downloading.
63 An alternate explanation is offered in Strahilevitz, supra note 57, at 568-69
(file-sharing software has features that technically impose file-sharing obligations
and/or that create the perception that others are sharing).
64 See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000) (people provide signals

HeinOnline -- 84 Or. L. Rev. 1141 2005

OREGON LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 84, 2005]

social esteem.6 5

Many users of file-sharing networks were unaware of copyright
issues until the first wave of litigation. File sharing has enough in
common with sharing CDs among friends and is different enough
from selling pirated CDs that users of file-sharing technology
might believe, as was the case in the initial years of Napster, that
file sharing is not a priori illegal and that it may be justifiable to

engage in file sharing until a court or statute explicitly states otherwise.66 The media exposure on copyright litigation has
changed this perception and informed users of the legal issues
involved with file sharing. Yet the effect of litigation on the copyright perspectives of individual file sharers has been very mod-

est. After the first wave of litigation, thirty-three percent of
teenagers believed that it was wrong to download unlicensed re-

productions of music (see Table 1). As to the legitimacy of litigating private copiers, a survey by E-Poll indicated that only
37.6% of all respondents agreed that the RIAA "should be filing
lawsuits," while sixty-two percent disagreed. Also, sixty-five percent found a five-dollar price reduction the most appealing alternative to peer-to-peer file sharing. 67 A study from NPD shows a
similar effect.68
in social interactions that they are of a "good" type in order to increase future exchange possibilities).
65 See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 57, at 369 (individuals seek to gain esteem in
social interactions); Symposium, The Legal Construction of Norms, 86 VA. L. REV.
1577 (2000) (same); Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic
Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998) (same).
66
See Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding
Boundaries of Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 34 (2004) (describing
the sequence from innovation to litigation).
67 See Online Piracy: Have Lawsuits Had an Impact on Downloads?, E-POLL,
stoNov. 4, 2003,
available at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/
The
ries.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/11-04-2003/0002050963&EDATE.
survey was first conducted April 8-11, 2003, prior to the first lawsuits and again on
October 7-10, 2003, after the last suits. The survey group consisted of 1075 and 1162
individuals all over thirteen years of age, respectively. Results for gender were
equally weighed. Id.; see also Paul Bond, Consumer Confusion, THE HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER.COM, Oct. 22, 2003, http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr/music/ feature -display.jsp?vnu-contentid=2007229; Europeans Balk at CD Prices, More
Downloading, DIGITAL Music NEWS, Dec. 7, 2004, http://www.digitalmusicnews.
com/results?title=Music20%Choice; Press Release, supra note 33.
68 A MusicLab survey by NPD reports that consumers' overall impressions of the
recording industry were negatively affected by threats of litigation. Two-thirds of
consumers who had recently shared files on P2P networks reported that the lawsuits
caused them to have a "much more" or "somewhat more" negative opinion of record companies in general. Press Release, NPD Group, Consumers Delete Large
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TABLE 1
EFFECT OF LITIGATION ON THE AMOUNT OF STUDENTS
69
BELIEVE THAT FILE SHARING IS ILLEGITIMATE

Ages 13-17
Ages 18-34
Ages 35-54
Ages 55+
Total

WHO

April 2003

October 2003

20%
30%
48%
63%
43%

33%
39%
55%
61%
47%

The precise effect of raising copyright awareness through litigation is ambiguous. Litigation informs copiers of the possible
dangers of sharing files, but at the same time, lawsuits affect the
normative outlook on copyright law. For the purpose of increasing copyright obedience, the interaction between litigation,
norms, and deterrence is important. In the normative view, people disobey a law if they believe it is illegitimate, regardless of
other costs and benefits of breaking that law. Norm effects might
thus cancel out deterrence effects if anticopyright norms are bolstered at an equal rate.
In the next Part, we collect and discuss new evidence on the
effect of litigation on the norms held by private copiers. We investigate the hypothesis that legal condemnations of norms may
have the unintended effect of strengthening the targeted norm.7 °
Although some studies have explored the interaction between
deterrence and norms with regard to tax evasion, 7 1 the countervailing norm effect hypothesis awaits further examination.7 2
Numbers of Digital Music Files from PC Hard Drives, the NPD Group Reports
(Nov. 5, 2003), available at http://www.npd.com/dynamic/releases/press_031105.htm.
69 Bond, supra note 67.
70 A legal condemnation of a norm might have the unintended effect of moving
"equilibrium behavior ... in the opposite direction from that intended by the law."
See Parisi & von Wangenheim, supra note 56, at 1.
71 See Wenzel, supra note 50.
72 Some scholars have argued that improved enforcement may backfire and produce increased tax evasion, but these viewpoints are contested. For a review of empirical evidence on the proposition that enforcement may backfire, see generally
Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1484-99 (2003). Lederman concludes:
In sum, the speculation that sanctions for tax evasion will tend to undermine compliance does not seem to be supported by the evidence. In the
experimental context, the availability of sanctions for failure to cooperate
increases cooperation. In the tax compliance context, audits increase even
compliance of those not threatened with audit.
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III
A

STUDY OF COPYRIGHT LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
SOCIAL NORMS

A.

Intentions

In this Part, we gather evidence on the interaction between
norms and deterrence in a scenario study. We examine how
norms influence behavior and the sensitivity of respondents to
different degrees of copyright enforcement. We devote particular attention to differences between regular users of file-sharing
technology and individuals who have never downloaded unlicensed music files. We relate these results to the burgeoning
literature on the interplay between law, norms, and psychological
processes.
B.

Design of the Study

The subjects for our experiment consisted of 288 undergradu-'
ate students at Ghent University.7 3 We asked all students to
complete a written survey containing two different enforcement
scenarios followed by a number of questions. Participants were
told that the survey was part of a law school experiment on how
people respond to copyright enforcement and that it would require about ten minutes of their time. No financial compensation
was offered for participating in the experiment, 74 but students reId.

at 1499.
73 The age of the students ranged from eighteen to thirty-six years old (mean (M)
19.83, standard deviation (Sd) = 2.09). The participants of the study are fairly
representative of the core target group in the P2P file-sharing controversy. According to a study by Ipsos-Reid, file sharers are predominantly in the twelve to twentyfour age group. See Robyn Greenspan, Making Money on Free Music, INTERNETNEWS.COM, June 12, 2002, http://www.internetnews.com/stats/ article.php/
1365161.
74 Generally, research has demonstrated how individuals who volunteer to participate in experiments genuinely make an effort to perform even in the absence of
monetary rewards. See generally Stephen M. Smith & Irwin P. Levin, Need for Cognition and Choice Framing Effects, 9 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 283 (1996).
Moreover, Camerer and Hogarth found that financial incentives generally do not
influence results. Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial
Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labour-ProductionFramework, 19
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 19, 22-23 (1999). In addition, Dawes stated that research
subjects are usually middle-class, achievement-oriented people who wish to perform
to the best of their abilities. Robin M. Dawes, The Purposeof Experiments: Ecological Validity Versus Comparing Hypotheses, 19 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 20, 20 (1996).
Along similar lines, psychologists presume that subjects cooperate with instructions
and are intrinsically motivated to perform well. Colin Camerer, IndividualDecision
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ceived participation credit for an introductory psychology course.
All subjects received the same written instructions on how to
complete the survey.7" The 700-seat auditorium provided anonymity although subjects completed the questionnaires in the
presence of the experimenters. After reading each hypothetical
enforcement scenario, students were requested to evaluate their
agreement or disagreement with a number of statements relating
to copyright enforcement, their own behavior, and the behavior
of others. They indicated their agreement with the provided
statements on a seven-point scale, assigning scores between two
endpoints of (1) strong disagreement and (7) strong agreement
(an answer of "1" meant the student strongly disagreed with the
statement; "7" meant the student strongly agreed).
We created different versions of each basic enforcement scenario and divided the students into different groups that were subjected to different modalities of copyright enforcement. The
severity and/or certainty of punishment for copyright infringements on P2P networks varied across groups in the following
ranges: (1) high (1/5 or 20%) versus low (1/10,000 or 0.01%) certainty of punishment and (2) low (20 euros) versus high (20,000
euros) sanction for each downloaded song. In our analysis of the
effect of different types of enforcement on individual file sharers
and non-file sharers, we distinguished between different scenarios that varied the hypothetical probability of getting caught and
the measure of punishment. The version of a scenario that any
given subject received was determined randomly. We drew conclusions as to the effect of each variable by comparing the responses of subjects in the different groups.7 6
In analyzing the responses, we looked for systematic differences between students who admitted to downloading music on
peer-to-peer networks and students who had never downloaded
music. Throughout the study, we used the terms present and potential file sharers to distinguish between students who share files
on peer-to-peer networks and students who have not yet been
engaged in file sharing. This distinction is important, as we shall
see below, because effective copyright enforcement might reMaking, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 587, 599 (John H.
Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1995); Smith & Levin, supra.

75 See infra app. at pt. I.
76 The random assignment of students to different enforcement scenarios ensured
the essential similarity between the pool of subjects in the different groups.
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quire a different approach to potential file sharers ("on the
fence") versus individuals who are already engaged in file-sharing activities ("rotten apples").
C.
1.

Discussion

Lawsuits as Focal Points

When asked whether they believe that "most people will continue to take the risks involved with file sharing," students in the
strong-armed enforcement group (i.e., those subjected to a hypothetical condition of high severity and high certainty of sanction)
expected more downloading than students in the low enforcement group (i.e., low ranges of severity and certainty).77
a. Results

Interestingly, an interaction effect also occurred between present/potential file sharers and the severity of sanctions.78 Students who do not engage in file sharing (or, more accurately,
students who reported that they do not share files) had different
expectations than file sharers. Regardless of the severity of the
sanction, present file sharers remained stable in their expectation
that others would continue to download.7 9 Subjects without any
file-sharing experience expected more file sharing when heavier
sanctions were imposed (see Figure 1 below)."0 The x-axis in Figure 1 differentiates between heavy (right-hand side) and low
(left-hand side) severity of punishment. The y-axis displays, in
increasing order, the perception of whether others were
downloading. While the expectation of present file sharers
(black line) was no different when strong or moderate sanctions
applied, potential file sharers (shaded line) expected more
downloading when sanctions were higher.
77 Respondents who were subjected to a low probability of punishment expected
less downloading (M = 4.51) than respondents who were subjected to a high
probability of punishment (M = 5.8). Respondents who were subjected to severe
hypothetical sanctions had lower expectations of general downloading activity (M =
4.95) relative to respondents who were subjected to more moderate sanctions (M =

4.51).
78 F(1287) = 3.90, p < .05.
79 M = 5.03 in the case of low severity of punishment and M = 4.98 in the case of
high severity, respectively.
80 M = 5.12 in the case of low severity of punishment and M = 5.74 in the case of
high severity, respectively.
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FIGURE

1

PERCEPTION OF DOWNLOADING ACTIVITIES: TYPE OF STUDENT
AND SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT
5.8
5.6

.

Present File Sharers

0

5.4
0)

Q)
S

--o-- Potential File
Sharers

5.2 -

-CU3

~0
9)

5

4.84.6
Low

Heavy

Severity of Punishment

b. Discussion
These questions examined the perception of how others respond to varying degrees of copyright enforcement. The perceptions of present and potential users of file-sharing technology are
important because they may serve as a proxy for the behavior of
these groups. Increased law enforcement efforts have the most
obvious effect of increasing the perceived expected liability costs.
But the impact of law enforcement is more complicated. Public
acts of law enforcement may have an impact on individuals' perception of the degree and frequency of civil disobedience. Social
psychology literature has amply demonstrated that individuals
are often influenced by their subjective perception of what others
are doing.8 ' Whenever such coordination is at play, the effect of
different degrees of copyright enforcement (more private suits
initiated by the record industry, higher settlement amounts, etc.)
might affect people's perceptions of what others will do and, consequently, have an impact on their own decisions with regard to
81 When law creates a focal point by expressing values that might tip norms to a
new equilibrium, this process may "create or destroy a social norm." Robert D.
Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 585 (1998). The
idea of law as focal point that coordinates expectations among citizens is further
explored in Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1649 (2000).
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file sharing.8 2 For instance, in a recent study, Parisi and von Wagenheim situate the interaction between law and norms within a
general opinion formation process.83 Because, in many cases,
"individuals do not have strong prior beliefs on whether any
given law is fair or unfair[,] [o]bservation of other people's reaction to the law (e.g., support, compliance, protest or civil disobedience) conveys some information that may create, reinforce or
modify their beliefs on the matter." 84 So when a new law is met
with strong opposition and disobedience from individuals whose
internal values are so different from the law that they are willing
to incur the costs of protest, individual observers may infer that
the law is not aligned with a common sense of justice. This might
undermine the law's authority in the minds of the observing public and ultimately strengthen the social norms by persuading
others that the new law is unjust. Similarly, in the context of
copyright law, some are convinced that copyright law obstructs
the opportunities offered by new technology." File swapping
and other public acts of "copyright disobedience" might thus
have an impact on the perceived legitimacy of copyright
enforcement.
In this regard, the results of the study do not bode well for
copyright-dependent industries: students believe that enforcement will not stop their peers from file sharing. In general, students believe that others will continue to download regardless of
the enforcement of copyright law. Not even in the severe punishment group (10,000 euros per downloaded CD) did the students
in our study think that downloading would come to a halt. In
fact, increased enforcement has a counterproductive effect on
potential file sharers. When the punishment for copyright infringement is severe, potential file sharers believe that others will
download more than when penalties are more moderate.
82 A recent experimental paper by Professors Bohnet and Cooter explores the
relative impact of this coordination versus the framing effects of legal rules. See Iris
Bohnet & Robert D. Cooter, Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection?

(Berkeley Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper Series No. 31, 2004) (experimental finding that sanctions affect behavior mostly by coordinating the beliefs of
people).
83 Parisi & von Wagenheim, supra note 56, at 8.
84 See id. at 9.
85 In the words of Justice Souter, "[Tlhe indications are that the ease of copying
songs or movies using software like Grokster's and Napster's is fostering disdain for
copyright protection." Grokster Il, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2775 (2005) (citing Wu, supra
note 8, at 724-26).
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2.

1149

Peer Group Identification

What are the effects of lawsuits on copynorms? Copyright enforcement and media coverage may direct individual beliefs toward copyright law or, on the contrary, generate sympathy for
the targeted class of violators and lead to increased social support for P2P file sharing. In a second part of the study, we asked
students to evaluate the current litigious nature of copyright enforcement against file sharers. We posed three related questions
on this point by asking the students to identify whether they
agreed with the following statements: (1) "I am of the opinion
that the music industry is conducting an unjust, disproportionate
policy"; (2) "[t]he policies of the music industry conflict with my
sense of justice"; and (3) "[t]he policies of the music industry are
an attack on my freedom to listen to music."86 Again, we asked
students whether these statements corresponded with their own
sentiments.8 7 The questions were put to two groups of students:
a group of present file sharers and a group of potential file sharers. Each group was exposed to different probabilistic enforcement regimes. 88
a.

Results

Although all students in the study appeared averse to lawsuits
against file sharers, people with file-sharing experience were
more opposed to enforcement (M = 4.78) than potential file
sharers (M = 4.09).89
In a regime of severe punishment, present file sharers reacted
differently from non-file sharers. 9° The former were outspoken
in their view that lawsuits are unjust and disproportionate (M =
5.08), whereas the latter were more neutral to the music industry's efforts to prevent file sharing (M = 3.61) (see Figure 2). In
the low punishment condition, the evaluation of the music indus86 The participants' responses to the three items were averaged to form a composite perception measure. The Cronbach Alpha, an intercorrelation measure, indicated that these three items fit very well together (A = .82).
87 Each item was presented on a seven-point Likert scale. The endpoints were
labelled as "i. Strongly disagree" and "7. Strongly agree." See infra app. at pt. 1.
88 The independent variables were manipulated in the following manner: individual scripts varied between (1) high (1/5 or 20%) or low (1/10,000 or 0.001%) rates of
certainty of punishment and (2) low (20) versus high (20,000) punishment for each
downloaded song.
89 The main effect for the type of user was F(1287) = 11.20, p < .01.
90 The interaction effect between downloading and severity of punishment was
F(1287) = 14.48, p < .01.
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try was comparable for present and potential file sharers (M =
4.47 versus M = 4.65) (see Figure 2). The x-axis in Figure 2 differentiates between heavy (right-hand side) and low (left-hand
side) severity of punishment. The y-axis displays, in increasing
order, students' negative perspective on the music industry.
While present file sharers (black line) were more anti-industry
when enforcement efforts were increased, anti-industry viewpoints were moderated for potential users (shaded line on the
right side of the x-axis).
FIGURE
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b.

Discussion

These results confirm the wide opposition and general ethical
aversion to the application of copyright law to peer-to-peer networks. The difference between potential and present users of
file-sharing technology can be attributed to various factors. First,
file sharers simply have more to lose from the strict enforcement
of copyright law. As a type of self-serving bias, file sharers might
engage in self-interested norm adjustments ("I want to download
music, so I think prohibiting peer-to-peer activities is unjust")
and convince others to do so as well. 91
91 See generally Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, An Experimental Investigation
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Second, a recent study on tax avoidance found that individuals
"adjust their own beliefs so as to justify their behaviour as right
and ethical. They then generalise these views to others, presumably to gain further social support. ' 92 Current research on the
causality of norms and behavior affords insight into possible underlying psychological processes. According to the theory of
cognitive dissonance, individuals tend to ignore or distort their
perception of the world when they sense that something in the
world is inconsistent with the cognitive frame through which they
see the world. If that becomes impossible, people "amend [their]
cognitive frame (i.e., the way we see and understand the world)
to incorporate [this] new perception."9' 3 When file sharers notice
that file sharing is pursued in courts, this might not correspond
with their previously held view of the world. They might ignore
copyright litigation for some time, but at a certain point, they will
need to either accept that file sharing is illegal or to realign this
new perception of reality (file sharing is being litigated) with a
new cognitive frame ("Despite litigation, file sharing should be
allowed"). Despite the obvious self-interested origin of such anticopyright norms, these normative beliefs may supervene on
causal accounts so that "people assert that interests have nothing
to do with their behavior in following various norms." 9 4
As we will discuss further in Part V, such ex post rationalizations of self-interested, antisocial conduct have important policy
implications9 5 because to address such conduct effectively, one
needs to differentiate between present and potential file sharers.
3.

Sticky Norms
In a third part of the study, we examined the impact of differ-

of Deterrence: Cheating, Self-Serving Bias, and Impulsivity, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 167

(2003) (finding that participants in cheating experiment were more likely to cheat if
they were prone to self-serving bias).
92 In a pioneering study on tax aversion, Michael Wenzel observes bidirectional
causality between self-interest and norms. He concludes that for taxpayers, antisocial conduct feeds back into personal and social norms. See Wenzel, supra note 50.
93 Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and
How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAx REV. 155, 201 n.113 (1996).
94 Rusell Hardin, Law and Social Norms in the Large, 86 VA. L. REV. 1821, 1831
(2000) (describing limits to social norm explanations).
95 See supra Part IV. Wenzel argues that ethics and utility overlap: "[T]he rationalisation of tax evasion or compliance refers first and foremost to moral concerns,
rather than social exchange considerations. As it seems, even the rational actor cannot live or act without concerns for ethics, even if they come after the fact." Wenzel,
supra note 50, at 505.
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ent modalities of copyright enforcement (i.e., higher rates of detection versus more severe punishment) on the (reported) norms
of students.9 6 To examine whether enforcement would realign
norms with copyright law, we presented students with two related questions by asking them to identify whether they agreed
with the following statements: (1) "These new developments are
gradually making me realize that illegally downloading music is
not ethical," and (2) "[these d]evelopments are causing me to adjust my norms regarding the illegal exchanges of music."9 7
Again, students were asked to what extent they agreed with
these statements.98
a.

Results

Although none of the students reported a significant norm
change, individuals without file-sharing experience indicated
more strongly that enforcement patterns would adjust their normative stance toward copyright law (M = 3.77) than did respondents with file-sharing experience (M = 3.23). 99 An interesting
difference surfaced with regard to the effect of punishment on
the norms of individuals with and without file-sharing experience
1° When subjected to heavy sanctions, file sharers
(see Figure 3).
believed that their behavior was ethical (M = 2.97) more so than
when they were subjected to more moderate sanctions (M =
3.50). By contrast, when individuals without file-sharing experience were subjected to strong sanctions, they agreed that
downloading music was unethical and unjust (M = 4.20) more so
than when they were subjected to more moderate sanctions (M =
3.35). In other words, steep penalties for file sharing have different effects on present and potential users: it emboldens the former into a justification of downloading while fostering
procopyright sentiments in the latter. The x-axis in Figure 3 differentiates between heavy (right-hand side) and low (left-hand
96 As before, the question was put to a group of users of peer-to-peer technology
and a group of non-file sharers. Each group was presented with different enforcement regimes. Across enforcement regimes, individual scripts varied between (1)
high (1/5 or 20%) or low (1/10,000 or 0.01%) rates of certainty of punishment and
(2) low (20) versus high (20,000) punishment for each downloaded song.
97 The Cronbach alpha for the 2 items was i = .78.
98 Once again, each item was presented on a seven-point Likert scale. The
endpoints were labelled as "1. Strongly disagree" and "7. Strongly agree." See infra
app. at pt. 1.
99 F(1287) = 7.16, p < .01.
100 F(1287) - 10.88, p < .01.
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side) severity of punishment. The y-axis displays, in increasing
order, how much students were willing to adjust their viewpoints
to copyright law. While present file sharers (black line) are not
likely to adjust their norms to copyright law when enforcement
efforts are increased, norm adjustments are stronger for potential
users when enforcement is toughened.
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Discussion

Some scholars have suggested that law may have an expressive
effect: expressing a legal condemnation has a symbolic quality
that will induce a correspondent preference adaptation among
individuals."a Our results provide no evidence of procopyright
norm adaptation regarding present users, who seem firmly entrenched in their anticopyright perspective. On the contrary, file
swappers, previously in a legal setting of large fines, resort to
higher levels of file swapping. If anything, the legal condemna101 The expressive function of the law captures the notion that a formal legal condemnation will induce compliance, irrespective of actual enforcement, because law
(as an express collective commitment) may engender intrinsic motivations or cause
people to conform since they believe that others will do so as well. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1363 (2000); McAdams, supra note 81; Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
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tion increases their anticopyright preferences. Indeed, in the
context of tax evasion, some scholars have argued that improved
enforcement may backfire and be counterproductive.10 2 Our
study provides new evidence on the possibility of a conflict between deterrence and norms, suggesting that, with regard to
users of peer-to-peer technology, heavy-handed enforcement indeed backfires and increases anticopyright norms. As we will see
below, this finding has specific relevance in the case of copyright
law.
4.

Norm Backlash

In a second part of the study, we informed students that enforcement against file sharing had now dropped to zero because
of perfect anonymity afforded by new technology." 3 This scenario is realistic in the context of the ongoing arms race between
content providers on one side and pirates and hackers on the
other. In this technological race, copy protection and circumvention play catch-up.10 4 At times where the hackers have the upper
hand, the situation resembles that of the present scenario: file
sharers do not fear enforcement because technology provides anonymity. 10 5 This emphasizes the importance of social norms in
the context of copyright enforcement. Whenever technological
advances in private copying have not yet been countered by content owners, either through technological self-help or judicial
102 See Lederman, supra note 54, at 1461-62 (arguing that most of the evidence of
norms backlash is overstated).
103 The latest advancement in peer-to-peer technology is anonymous file sharing
of this sort. For example, see the announcement of the latest version of Blubster 2.5,
a peer-to-peer file-trading software tool that claims to protect user anonymity.

Video: Anonymous P2P File Trading, CNET NEWS.COM, July 1, 2003, http://

news.com.com/1606-2-740866.html.
104 On the interaction between self-help and law, see generally Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self-Help (Univ. Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law
& Econ. Working Paper No. 232, 2004), available at http//www.law.uchicago.edu/
LaweconlWkngPprs_226-50/232-dgl-self-help.pdf (describing how legal rules encourage, harness, deter, and sometimes defer to self-help mechanisms).
105 Sony BMG is taking the lead with several new copy-protected CDs. Sony
BMG plans to employ either the MediaMax solution from SunnComm or XCP from
First4lnternet. The strategy is a bit risky for the major label since consumers were
annoyed at earlier protection attempts. But executives are reportedly now feeling
more comfortable with current protection technologies that offer better playback
and reliability across a wider range of devices. See Ed Christman, Sony BMG
Ramps Up CD Copy-Protection Plan, IDOBI NETWORK, Feb. 26, 2005, availableat
http://idobi.com/news.wml?200502262.
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evaluation,0 6 norms are a strong determinant of conduct.
In order to get a measure of the effect of copyright enforcement in times when there is a lag in enforcement, we asked respondents whether, during this protected period, "[t]he
enforcement policy of the music industry prior to the introduction of the new protective software influences the amount of music I will resume downloading." ' 7
a. Results
First, none of the respondents indicated that prior enforcement
strategies would fundamentally affect their behavior. All of the
answers were in the 4 to 5 range on a scale in which 7 denoted
strong agreement. Second, prior enforcement policies had different effects on present and potential file sharers.10 8 The x-axis in
Figure 4 differentiates between heavy (right-hand side) and low
(left-hand side) severity of punishment. The y-axis displays, in
increasing order, how the enforcement policy of the music industry prior to the introduction of the new protective software influences the amount of music students will download. Heavy
punishment schedules in times of enforcement led file sharers
(black line) to higher levels of downloading during enforcement
lags (M = 5.24) relative to individuals without file-sharing experience (shaded line) (M = 4.57). The converse result emerged with
regard to punishment in the lower range. Potential file sharers
(shaded line) downloaded more during an enforcement downtime (M = 5.26) relative to present file sharers (M = 4.54). In
other words, penalties for copyright offenses had opposite effects
106 Such enforcement lags also follow from the fact that the socioeconomic effects
of technological advances are not clear cut at the moment of inception or the first
months of use. For instance, in the case of Napster, it took the record industry almost a year to realize the scale of the opportunity costs that the technology
presented. See Depoorter, supra note 66. The unpredictability of technology is best
illustrated by the comment of MPAA president Jack Valenti when video recorder
technology was introduced: "I say to you that the VCR is to the American film
producer and the American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home
alone." Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794,
H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Admininstration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong. 8 (1982) (statement of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of
America, Inc.). VCR technology would eventually become a billion-dollar market
to the entertainment industry. See KJB, KJB's Backlash #5: The MPAA Owns You
All, IGN NEws, Nov. 16, 2004, http://filmforce.ign.com/articles/566/566370pl.html.
107 See infra app. at pt. II.

108 F(1287) = 5.14, p < .01.
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on those respondents without file-sharing experience and those
with file-sharing experience.
FIGURE
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b.

Discussion

What conclusions can be derived from this? As the results indicate, file swappers who were previously in a legal setting of
stringent enforcement intend to download more music than file
swappers previously subject to more moderate sanctions for
downloading. The inevitable lags in enforcement thus present a
cautionary note: exclusive reliance on punishment might be unfortunate given the backlash effect when enforcement is temporarily suspended.
The results also indicate a differentiated effect between present and potential file sharers. The counterproductive effect of
heavy-handed copyright enforcement does not occur with regard
to potential file sharers. When severe sanctions are imposed,
nonusers of peer-to-peer technology report lower intentions of
downloading during enforcement lags. Weak sanctions thus remove the inhibitions of potential file sharers but have a moderating effect on the downloading behavior of experienced file
sharers.
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5.

Summary

In this Part, we gathered data on the effect of copyright enforcement on social norms. In doing so, we added some empirical evidence to the burgeoning theoretical literature on social
norms. Our study leads us to a number of important conclusions.
Media attention of copyright lawsuits against private individuals does not lead file sharers to believe that their peers will stop
downloading. For those inexperienced with file sharing, enforcement actually increases the perception that others are downloading music 0 9
Additionally, anticopyright norms of present users of peer-topeer technology cannot be unraveled through enforcement. Irrespective of the level of punishment, there is no norm change toward procopyright viewpoints among experienced users of peerto-peer technology. By contrast, the norms of students who have
not yet been exposed to peer-to-peer software are more amenable to procopyright adjustments through enforcement.
Furthermore, there may be a backlash effect among users of
file-sharing technology. When severe sanctions are imposed,
present users of file-sharing technology will likely make up for
lost time whenever enforcement efforts are hindered.
There are also different norm effects for present and potential
peer-to-peer users. Pro-file-sharing norms of present users are
relatively stable and are encouraged when enforcement* is
stepped up, which results in higher download activity levels when
enforcement is temporarily suspended. Enforcement has an ambivalent effect on individuals who have not applied file-sharing
technology. Severe sanctions do not have a counterproductive
effect on their copyright norms, yet exposure to information on
copyright enforcement against peer-to-peer software reinforces
their perception that others are engaged in file sharing.
These differences are indicative of a tipping point: at a certain
level of activity (file sharing), the evaluation of that behavior is
internalized.1 1 ° As a result, the norm becomes robust-also re109 Enforcement may work as a cue that others are not complying with the rules,
and this information may reduce overall compliance. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000) (introducing a fine reduces
compliance of late-arriving parents in day care centers).
110 On the internalization of social norms, see Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws
Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV.
1577 (2000); Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression,
Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1 (2000).
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ferred to as the "stickiness" of social norms-and presents a
more ardent challenge to legal enforcement efforts.1 11 An additional factor that might be at work here is what social psychologists describe as "group identification."' 12 At a certain point,
individuals identify themselves in relation to other individuals
who are engaged in similar acts. This process of obtaining a
group identity eventually affects normative conceptions of the
group's activities and might trigger different reactions to enforcement. Perhaps, as users become more accustomed to using filesharing technologies, they identify with the anticopyright subculture, internalizing the norms and ethics of the relevant
3
11

community.

Whatever the nature of the underlying processes that create
these differentiated norm effects between present and potential
file sharers, as a general conclusion, copyright enforcement
would be well advised to apply differentiated strategies to various target groups. Experienced users are, in the language of recent social norms literature, more responsive to "gentle nudges"
than to "hard shoves"; that is, pushing hard against the existing
norms of these users backfires and emboldens the preexisting an14
ticopyright norms that enforcement intends to combat.
In the next Part, we draw some broader lessons from the results of the study, in particular with regard to the policy choices
that regulators, courts, and copyright holders face when approaching the widespread use of copyrighted material on filesharing networks.
111 See infra note 112.
112 See generally David De Cremer, Effect of Group Identification on the Use of
Attributions, 140(2) J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 267 (2000).

113 Social norms can impact behavior when internalized through a process of identification with the relevant social group. See Michael Wenzel, An Analysis of Norm
Processes in Tax Compliance, 25 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 213, 224 (2004). For instance,
in the context of tax compliance, research demonstrates that "perceived social
norms will causally affect tax compliance when taxpayers identify with the group to
which
the norms are attributed." Wenzel, supra note 50, at 495.
114 Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms
Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607-08 (2000) (proposing that moderate penalties
for evasion may be more effective than severe condemnation in societies enjoying
relatively compliant norms). In a different study on the norm sensitivities of regular
and occasional users of P2P technology, we observed a similar effect. Severe sanctions generated a particularly strong backlash effect among regular users of P2P
technology. See Ben Depoorter et al., Gentle Nudges v. Hard Shoves in Copyright
Law: An Empirical Study on the Conflict Between Norms and Enforcement 7 (Ghent
Ctr. for Advanced Studies in Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 6, 2005), availableat
http://ssrn.com/abstract=740184.
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IV
LESSONS FROM COPYRIGHT LAW SOCIAL NORMS

A.

From Copyright to Criminal Law

Copyright enforcement is increasingly moving toward criminal
prosecutions of digital piracy.11 5 At both the state and federal
levels, legislative proposals are shifting copyright enforcement

into the realm of criminal law.116 Several recent legislative proposals have sought to increase the involvement of the Justice Department in punishing users of peer-to-peer networks. 1 7 For
instance, the proposed Protecting Intellectual Rights Against
Theft and Expropriation Act of 2004 (PIRATE Act) would em-

power the Justice Department to initiate private lawsuits against
file sharers.118 In January 2005, a bill was introduced in the Cali115 "[Tlhe past ten to twenty years
Legislative branches appear agreeable
cution of copyright infringement." I.
ment, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.

have shown that both the Executive and the
to increasing the level of detection and proseTrotter Hardy, Criminal Copyright InfringeJ. 305, 323 (2002) (discussing the trend of

criminalization of noncommercial copyright infringements).

Currently, U.S. copy-

right law classifies the following copyright infringements as criminal offenses:
(1) In general-Any person who willfully infringes a copyright shall be
punished as provided under section 2319 of title 18, if the infringement
was committed(A) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain;
(B) by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means,
during any 180-day period, of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of
1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of
more than $1,000;
(2) Evidence.-For purposes of this subsection, evidence of reproduction
or distribution of a copyrighted work, by itself, shall not be sufficient to
establish willful infringement of a copyright.
17 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 2005).
116 The first step in the direction of direct copyright criminalization was initiated
in the second half of the 1990s when the No Electronic Theft (NET) Act equated
certain types of copyright infringement with physical-space theft. See No Electronic
Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997). For a discussion of this
trend, see Eric Goldman, A Road to No Warez: The No Electronic Theft Act and
Criminal
Copyright Infringement, 82 OR. L. REV. 369 (2003).
117 Xeni Jardin, CongressMoves to Criminalize P2P, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 26, 2004,
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,62830,00.html.
118 Protecting Intellectual Rights Against Theft and Expropriation (PIRATE) Act
of 2004, S. 2237, 108th Cong. § 2(a) (2004) (as passed by Senate, June 25, 2004). The
bill was introduced by Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Patrick Leahy (D-VT). As
one commentator notes, Senator Hatch believes "operators of P2P networks are
running a conspiracy in which they lure children and young people with free music,
movies and pornography. With these 'human shields,' the P2P companies are trying
to blackmail the entertainment industries into accepting their networks as a distribution channel and source of revenue." Jardin, supra note 117. Furthermore, both
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fornia legislature that sought to criminalize selling, advertising,
and distributing peer-to-peer file-sharing software." 9 The bill

aimed to make it a crime to sell file-sharing software without taking reasonable care to prevent copyright infringement and pornography swapping. 120 Similarly, on the federal level, the
Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004 (Induce Act)
would have enabled copyright holders to sue the creators of
peer-to-peer applications also on criminal grounds. 1 21 The In-

duce Act has been stalled, but some of the criminal elements involving movie piracy were retained in the Family Entertainment
and Copyright Act of 2005.122

From the standpoint of an economic analysis of enforcement,
copyright infringements share some (but not all) properties with
criminal offenses: copyright infringements are often intentional,
involve coercive transfers of property rights in settings where
transaction costs are low, 123 and suffer from low rates of appre-

hension. Also, copyright infringements involve judgment-proof
issues when copyright infringers are students who cannot afford
to pay deterrence-based statutory judgments.
One approach to address issues of underdeterrence or judg-

ment-proof offenders is to resort to more punitive approaches.
For instance, low probabilities of punishment can be amended by

raising copyright statutory remedies further beyond private
harm. Imposing nonpecuniary costs, such as incarceration, resolves the judgment-proof issue in cases of insolvency. Several
Senator Hatch and the entertainment industry see P2P networks as "lur[ing] young
Internet users into a lifetime of lawbreaking." Eric Bangeman, FederalP2P Legislation in the Works, ARSTECHNICA, Mar. 29, 2004, http://arstechnica.com/ news/posts/
1080594054.html.
119 S.B. 96, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005).
120 California Senator Goes After P2P, RED HERRING, Jan. 18, 2005 (on file with
author), http://www.redherring.com.
121 S. 2560, 108th Cong. § 2 (2004).
122 Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, S. 167, 109th Cong. § 102
(2005); H.R. 357, 109th Cong. § 102 (2005). For instance, section 167 penalizes those
who camcord motion pictures in movie theaters and creates civil and criminal penalties for those who willfully distribute pre-release works. Also, section 103 creates a
criminal penalty for the willful distribution of works being prepared for commercial
distribution.
123 In most instances, the costs for obtaining licenses are low. This applies in particular when licensees can obtain a license from a copyright collective or copyright
clearance center. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293
(1996) (analyzing the role of collective rights organizations in reducing transaction
costs in copyright law).
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current proposals would take copyright law in this direction. 124
Given, however, that present statutory penalties for direct infringements are already quite steep, continuing to raise copyright
statutory penalties upward, either in monetary or nonpecuniary
terms, will likely increase the fallout between copynorms in action and copyright law in the books. As documented in Part III,
the pursuit of copyright enforcement, from a narrow-deterrence
perspective, is counterproductive on the norm level. Strongarmed enforcement tactics induce strong anticopyright aversion.
Instead, as we discuss next, insights from social psychology suggest that enforcement patterns should differentiate on the basis
of the norm sensitivity of the infringer.
B.
1.

From Copyright to Education

On the Fence

In cooperation with the entertainment industry, several private
organizations 12 are currently taking the copyright norms debate
into high schools and middle schools. 126 The Peers2Peers Web
site provides insight into the social meaning of copyright as it is
projected onto teenagers:
Members of the recording industry and recording artists will
be working with Peers2Peers to help kids and teens understand how serious a problem this is. They will also be trying to
show how everyone is hurt when kids don't respect the laws.
And how many other kids and teens are hurt when their parents lose their jobs because of the huge losses experienced by
the recording industry. Kids often forget that most of the people employed in the recording industry aren't as rich and famous as Madonna. And they need their weekly paychecks to
feed their families. They also don't realize the long-term effects of stealing music. The music industry can't continue to
survive this way, and won't be around to offer them jobs when
they grow
up or help promote new artists in the same way they
-2 7
have.

124 See supra Part IV.A.
125 Wiredsafety.org advertises its services as "creating good cybercitizens" with
the aid of "[live Marvel super hero character appearances." Flyer from Presentation of Parry Aftab, Executive Director, Wiredsafety.org, at the FrC Public Workshop on Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing: Consumer Protection and Competition Issues
(Dec. 15-16, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/ filesharing/presentations/
aftab.pdf.
126 See PEERS2PEERS, How CAN KIDS AND TEENS HELP EACH OTHER Do
WHAT'S RIGHT?, http://www.peers2peers.org/pages/3/index.htm (last visited Feb. 4,
2006).
127 Id.
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How realistic is it to rely on educational campaigns to persuade teenagers of proindustry copyright views? The results of
this study indicate that copyright norms of students who have not
yet been exposed to peer-to-peer software are still amenable to
procopyright views. In contrast, anticopyright positions among
experienced users of peer-to-peer technology are relatively fixed.
Furthermore, in a different study, we observed that the tipping
point between flexible copyright positions and entrenched anticopyright viewpoints kick in quite fast. 1 28 Given the quick intake of anticopyright norms and the "stickiness" of social norms,
as illustrated in Part III, the entertainment industry is wise to
bring the copyright case to the youngest segments of the
population.
2.

Rotten Apples?

In many ways, today's legal bouts can be viewed as a struggle
to influence the social meaning of downloading and the sharing
of copyrighted work. The legal battles over the appropriateness
of downloading and file-sharing technologies might take aim at
redirecting the norms and values regarding file sharing on peerto-peer networks.
Can litigation help shape the perception of file sharing and
peer-to-peer networks? How likely is it that lawsuits lead the
general audience to equate file sharing with theft? Will file sharers be shamed in a social context? The conditions of such transformations remain poorly understood. Some scholars believe
that norms sometimes trace law, altering the preferences for the
1 29
rules contained therein.
But can we place the burden of enforcing digital copyright law
on the shoulders of a presumed expressive effect of the law and
its enforcement? There is cause for healthy skepticism of a preference-shaping effect of copyright law enforcement.
First, as we observed in Part III, the perceived unjust/illegitimate nature of copyright enforcement reduces the likelihood that
copyright litigation will alter people's preference for behaving according to that law. In fact, enforcement against peer-to-peer
128 For the discussion of this empirical evidence, see supra Part III. Also, in another study, we examined the different norm effects between frequent and occasional downloaders. Depoorter et al., supra note 114, at 5 (arguing that after
downloading fifty songs, the evaluation of downloading is internalized).
129 See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 81.
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users leads to increased copyright aversion among regular users
of peer-to-peer technology.
Second, the nature of copyright infringements reduces the potential for the expressive effect of the law to enhance private enforcement of those laws among private individuals. Unlike
smoking and talking on cell phones on trains, individual copyright law infringements mostly lack a public component. The fact
that most peer-to-peer copyright violations occur inside private
homes preempts reliance on the individual conferral of social
sanctions as envisaged by the expressive theories of the law. As
opposed to littering on the street, copyright-abiding citizens have
few opportunities to "shame" file swappers in daily interactions.
To the contrary, certain attributes of file-sharing software, such
as the display of file-sharing statistics and the number of users
that are online, increase the perception that others are also engaged in file sharing.1 3 ° This might lead to an increase in file
sharing because, as socio-psychological evidence reveals, the apparent behavior of others may influence the social meaning and
behavior of neutral observers.1 3 1
C. From Copyright to Self-Help
Because of the costs of litigating copyright infringement, content holders often turn to self-help alternatives. Investments in
advanced technology are part of content producers' strategy to
retain some of the control that seems to be slipping in the era of
digital reproduction of audio and visual entertainment. Advancements in automated rights management technology, encryption software, and "tethered" technology 132 provide
copyright owners with the tools to regulate access and to enjoin
unauthorized individual use of content. When effective, digital
rights management technology enables "information providers to
enforce standard copyright claims mechanically, without resort to
the threat of litigation. ' 133 Such technology moves copyright
130
131

Strahilevitz, supra note 57, at 551.
For a review, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A

Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000).

132 "Tethered" technology allows copyright holders to time the exact number of
playbacks of a digital audio or audiovisual good by a consumer and to bar further
access after the contractually provided amount of uses. Such measures can be understood as self-help rights of injunction.
133 Daniel J. Gervais, Towards a New Core International Copyright Norm: The
Reverse Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 9 n.29 (2005). Of

course, no enforcement mechanism is truly perfect. The circumvention of DVD
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remedies from liability protection, where one pays compensation
after the infringement, to a system of property rule protection,
where the technology effectively acts as an ex ante injunction.
The use of technology for the private enforcement of copyrights is not without controversy. Some argue that self-help extends copyright protection beyond constitutionally provided
limits.

13 4

According to others, the literal enforcement of copy-

right law through technology will align copyright law with the
broader restrictions of use as they apply to patent law. 1 35 Because successful self-help procedures establish a more strict enforcement pattern than the lenient system of imperfect
enforcement of copyright law to which consumers have grown
accustomed, 136 consumers often negatively perceive self-help
measures. One notable example is the system of region-specific
codes on DVD technology that prevents arbitrage between commercial pirates across markets but, in doing so, also makes it impossible for unknowing consumers to play DVDs at home they
have bought, for instance, during an overseas trip to Europe.
For content holders as well as consumers, copy protection is a
double-edged sword. In the hands of content holders, circumContent Scrambling systems, Real Networks' streaming protection measures,
Adobe's eBook Reader, and the security code of the Xbox game console confirms
that whenever a technological protection of intellectual property is created, some
specialist will always be able to compromise this technology.
134 See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line
Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 511, 513 (1997) (arguing that standardized, uniformly enforceable contracts will regulate and diminish copyright user rights); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
285 (1996) (arguing that technology raises high fences that amount to unprecedented
copyright control); David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contractand Public Policy:
Federal Preemption of Software License ProhibitionsAgainst Reverse Engineering,
53 U. PIrr. L. REV. 543, 608 (1992) (software license terms amount to "extra-statutory super-copyright"); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 4,
1996, availableat http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/ 4.01/white.paperpr.html (arguing that technology gives rightholders much stronger protection than the rights
held under the traditional copyright regime). But see Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs.
Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use
Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REv. 557, 614-18 (1998) (arguing that those who rely on methods subject to preemption have the opportunity to exit from copyright into contract
law).
135 See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Seller and
User Liability in Intellectual Property Law, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 37-45 (1999).
136 Compare the enforcement of copyright law against individual offenders with
the traditional regime in which commercial piracy was the focus. See Anna Wilde
Mathews & Bruce Orwall, Industry to Sue People Abetting Net Song Swaps, WALL
ST. J., July 3, 2002, at B1. These types of suits are now manageable in the digital era
because footprints are left behind.
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vention technology can be part of a strategy to direct copyright
toward a more strict, literal enforcement of copyright law. In the
hands of sophisticated programmers, so-called "hackers," the
very technology that enables strong enforcement reduces the
costs of the illegitimate transfer of content. A proper understanding of this dual nature of technology gives a different overall perspective on the implications of content holders' recourse to
technological self-help. Whenever intellectual property is placed
in a technological lock, specialists will always be able to pick the
lock;1 37 i.e., the same technology that allows the creation of digital protection can be used to break that technology. The end result is thus an "arms race" between content providers and
circumvention. Overall, the duplicative investments in protection, the subsequent increase in consumer prices, and the technologically restricted uses of copyright goods reinforce the
perception that copyright holders overreach. Self-help thus adds
to the highly polarized copyright landscape that fosters today's
widespread anticopyright law environment.
D.

From Copyright to Taxes

Several commentators have suggested that copyright law
should abandon exclusion rights in favor of a collective licensing
system that allows users to engage fully in private copying. Consumers would be required to pay a blanket license fee to compensate copyright holders for their losses in revenue.' 3 8
137 The most embarrassing illustration of this is the failure of the Secure Digital
Music Initiative (SDMI). The recording industry was hopeful that it would secure

protection for its future releases with a new watermark technology that placed a
code onto a file that was supposed to be impossible to remove without damaging the

quality of the sound or image. When the SDMI opened a hacking contest, challenging the public to break the digital watermarks, Professor Felten and a team of computer experts cracked several of these watermarks. When Felten wanted to present
his findings at a conference, the SMDI and the RIAA threatened to sue for copyright law violation. Felten's free speech lawsuit was dismissed in the Federal Circuit.
See John Schwartz, 2 Copyright Cases Decided in Favor of EntertainmentIndustry,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at C4.
138 WILLIAM W. FISHER

III,

PROMISES To KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE

FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT ch. 6 (2004), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edul

people/tfisher/PTKChapter6.pdf (proposing a governmentally administered system
that rewards copyright holders for commercial and noncommercial uses); Ku, supra

note 46, at 312-16 (proposing statutory levies on Internet service subscriptions and
sales of computer, audio, and video equipment); Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2004) (describing a voluntary collective

licensing scheme that combines blanket fees or levies and an opt-out mechanism for
copyright holders); Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53
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Consumers would thus purchase a "license to file share" or gain
"copyright immunity" by paying a levy on peer-to-peer goods
and services instead of directly buying licensed content from copyright holders. For content holders, these proposals are
equivalent to compulsory licensing; for consumers, these proposals offer a system that closely resembles a copyright tax. In several proposals, a central administration would impose a copyright
blanket levy on technology that enhances peer-to-peer file sharing. 1 39 Revenues could then be channeled to content holders
proportionally to the amount of times their product had been
downloaded.
A tax- or levy-based system takes the angle out of the proprietary copyright model by forcing content holders to relinquish
some control over copyrighted content, such as pricing decisions
and veto rights. For consumers, collective licensing closely
mimics the conditions and modalities of file sharing: music is
available on an "all-you-can-eat" basis.
There are many possible objections to such collective licensing
proposals. For instance, because of the lack of price discrimination, low-level users cross-subsidize high-level users since levies
would be based on the average download levels of all consumers.
Levies also tend to include non-copyright-related uses because of
a lack of discriminatory accuracy. Today, for instance, copyright
levies on blank CDs and CD-writers suffer from such overinclusiveness because they do not differentiate between fair uses, noncopyright-involving uses, and unlicensed uses.
Nevertheless, many commentators agree that a legislative outcome along the lines of a copyright tax or levy for file sharing is
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673, 678 (2003) (proposing a single "right to 'commercially
exploit"' copyrighted expressions); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright:
Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the DigitalMillennium Copyright Act, 87

L. REV. 813, 852-53 (2001) (arguing for a levy-based approach in comparison to
encryption-based approaches); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial
Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-PeerFileSharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2003)
(providing a blueprint for the establishment of a "noncommercial use levy").
139 See, e.g., FiSHER, supra note 138 (describing how a governmentally administered system rewards copyright holders for both commercial and noncommercial
uses on the basis of a tracking system for the transmissions of digital copies of the
work); Ku, supra note 46, at 313 (describing how the government would collect and
distribute the proceeds to artists based on aggregate Internet use); Netanel, supra
note 138, at 43-58 (describing how the noncommercial use levy is imposed on the
sale of any consumer product or service whose value is substantially enhanced by
P2P file sharing, such as Internet access, P2P software and services, CD burners,
MP3 players, and digital video recorders).
VA.
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inevitable. Throughout the history of copyright law, government-mediated collective licensing arrangements have resolved
difficult copyright issues involving new media and
technologies. 140
Although we have not evaluated the responses of students to a
blanket tax, it is likely that such an initiative would induce less
copyright aversion than the current litigation campaign against
file swappers. As Justice Souter suggested in Grokster, the disdain for copyright protection might originate in a sentiment that
copyright enforcement obstructs the great advantages afforded
by new technology. 141 For this reason, content holders' favored
solution to copyright disobedience (to permit only legal
downloads, particularly on a per-song basis) mimics poorly the
cognitive frame of file sharers. According to many students, the
current propriety-exclusion approach to legal downloads fails to
capture the opportunities for a wider cultural exchange among
peers.

142

Because the attractiveness of new technology lies, in part, in
the complementary consumption of music, all-inclusive licenses
replicate more closely today's environment of general accessibility to music. Inclusion also has the advantage of avoiding copy43
right deadweight losses from duopoly pricing and holdouts.
Naturally, compulsory licensing poses many challenges (overinclusiveness, cross-subsidization, reduced control for copyright
holders), but it is clear that a tax-based approach is the most appeasing solution from the social norm perspective.
A crucial aspect of the effect of legal rules on social norms is
the gap between the legal rule and the social norm held by most
individuals. If the law proscribes something that is widely perceived as unfair, the law may encounter more resistance and
140 The history of compulsory licensing in U.S. copyright law is extensive. First
introduced to extend copyright protection to player piano rolls, it was also applied to
protect "mechanical reproductions" of nondramatic musical works, satellite retransmissions of television programming, the distribution of sound recordings via digital
transmission, the transmission of sound recordings by webcasters, and the development of new media technologies, such as in the Audio Home Recordings Act of
1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000). For an overview, see Peter K. Yu, P2P and the

Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 705-08 (2005).
141 Grokster I11, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2775 (2005).
142

Such statements can be found across campuses in the United States. See John

Schwartz, Trying to Keep Young Internet Users from a Life of Piracy, N.Y.

TIMES,

Dec. 25, 2001, at C1.
143 Ben Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection:A Price
Theory Explanation, 21 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 453, 461 (2001).

HeinOnline -- 84 Or. L. Rev. 1167 2005

1168

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84, 2005]

open opposition. In documenting the counterproductive norm
effects, our findings thus add to the comparative appeal of a levybased resolution to file sharing. Social norm complications accentuate the advantages of aligning copyright law more closely
with copyright norms.
V
BACK TO COMMERCIAL INTERMEDIARIES AND

MGM

STUDIOS, INC. v. GROKSTER, LTD.

In June 2005, the United States Supreme Court held that peerto-peer software producers can be held accountable for copyright
violations.1 4 4 This came as a gust of fresh air to copyright-dependent industries that had previously failed in their earlier lower
court attempts to demonstrate that certain producers of decentralized file-sharing technology should be held accountable for
14 5
their involvement in copyright infringements.
Has the Supreme Court provided relief to content-dependent
industries? Perhaps music publishers will be able to avoid the
social norm obstacles involved with litigating private users and
revert back to an exclusive focus on commercial intermediaries in
private copying? There are several reasons why the focus on
commercial piracy limits the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Grokster on the availability of file-sharing applications.
We first provide a brief overview of the Grokster case.
A.

Grokster Revisited

Both the trial and appellate courts refused to apply the Napster precedent 146 to decentralized file-sharing services in Grokster. In the circuit court's view, liability for contributory
infringement "accrues where a defendant has actual-not merely
constructive-knowledge of the infringement at a time during
which the defendant materially contributes to that infringement."14' 7 Specifically, liability implies "actual knowledge of infringement at a time when [file-sharing services] can use that
144 Grokster 111, 125 S. Ct. at 2774 (holding that there was clear evidence of express promotion, marketing, and intent to promote infringements by Grokster and
StreamCast Networks).
145 Grokster II, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004); Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029
(C.D. Cal. 2003); see infra notes 146-150 and accompanying text.
146 See Napster I1, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
147 Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (citing Napster 11, 239 F.3d at 1020-22),
aff'd, Grokster 11, 380 F.3d 1154.

HeinOnline -- 84 Or. L. Rev. 1168 2005

The Case Against Copyright Litigation

knowledge to stop the particular infringement."' 48 Contrary to
Napster, the court found that neither Grokster nor StreamCast
materially contributed to copyright infringements. While Napster
provided the "site and facilities" that enabled direct infringements (hosting a central list of the files on each user's computer,
etc.), 14 9 Grokster provided no such service.15°

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court ruling, holding
that peer-to-peer software producers can be held accountable for
copyright violations if they invoke copyright-infringing uses and
take active steps to that end. 5 ' Mindful of the beneficial uses of

peer-to-peer technology and hesitant to hamper innovation in
new communication technologies,' 52 the Court declined to redefine or quantify "substantive" noninfringing uses to exclude peerto-peer technology, but it instead adopted the inducement theory
from patent law.1 53 Commercial agents can be held accountable
for copyright infringements when they distribute their products

"with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright as
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement."1'5 4
Although the exact impact of this landmark decision will be

unveiled in the lower courts, it appears that contributory liability
for peer-to-peer technology will depend on what comprises evidence of, in the Court's language, "active steps.., taken with the

purpose of bringing about infringing acts. 1 5 5 From the majority
opinion, it appears that the focus rests with advertisements and
business models that aim to derive commercial profits from copy-

right-infringing uses of the technology (peer-to-peer services).
As several commentators agree, however, there is little reason
to assume that the Grokster precedent will fundamentally alter
Id. at 1037 (emphasis added).
Napster 11, 239 F.3d at 1022.
15 0 See Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1038 (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996)). "[T]he defendant did not have to directly promote the infringing products to be held liable, it was enough that the
defendant provided 'the site and facilities for known infringing activity."' Id. (quoting Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264).
151 Grokster 111, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2782 (2005).
152 Id. at 2775, 2778, 2780.
153 Id. at 2779 (citing Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1991); Henry
v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1917); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Kelsey
Elec. Ry. Specialty Co., 75 F. 1005, 1007-08 (2d Cir. 1896); Rumford Chem. Works v.
Hecker, 20 F. Cas. 1342, 1346 (C.C.D.N.J. 1876) (No. 12,133)).
154 Id. 125 S. Ct. at 2770.
155 Id. at 2781.
148

149
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the balance of peer-to-peer activities and shift the balance of
copyright litigation back to commercial intermediaries. 15 6 There

are several reasons why the Court's focus on commercial intermediaries in Grokster limits the likely impact of the decision
on file sharing.
B.

Life Cycles of Digital Technology

Technological advancements have reduced the role of in-

termediaries in digital copyright infringements. For the purpose
of establishing vicarious liability, the technological difference between Napster and more advanced file-sharing technologies lies
with Napster's central registry, which allows users to identify
MP3 files for downloads, 157 whereas peer-to-peer file-sharing
programs such as Grokster operate independently on each user's
computer. 158 While Napster indexed the files contained on each
user's computer and every search request had to pass along Napster servers,'1 59 Grokster user activities (connecting to the net-

work and searching, selecting, and downloading files) occurred
156 Arik Hesseldahl, The Post-GroksterEra Begins, FORBES.COM, June 27, 2005,

http://www.forbes.com/technology/2005106/27/grokster-copyright-file-sharingcx ah 0627grokster2.html; Jeff Howe, The UproarOver Downloads, WIRED MAGAZINE, Aug. 2005, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/ archive/13.08/
start.html?pg=ll; Grokster Decision: The Experts React, CNNMoNEY, June 27, 2005
(on file with author).
157 Napster operated with a:
[P]roprietary centralized indexing software architecture in which a collective index of available files was maintained on servers it owned and operated. A user who was seeking to obtain a digital copy of a recording would
transmit a search request to the Napster server, the software would conduct a text search of the centralized index for matching files, and the search
results would be transmitted to the requesting user. If -the results showed
that another Napster user was logged on to the Napster server and offering
to share the requested recording, the requesting user could then connect
directly with the offering user and download the music file.
Grokster I, 380 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Napster 11, 239 F.3d 1004,
1011-12 (9th Cir. 2001); Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 905-08 (N.D. Cal. 2000)).
158 Currently, there are three different methods of indexing that most peer-topeer file-sharing programs use: "(1) a centralized indexing system, maintaining a list
of avail-able [sic] files on one or more centralized servers; (2) a completely decentralized indexing system, in which each computer maintains a list of files available on
that computer only; and (3) a 'supernode' system, in which a select number of computers act as indexing servers." Id. at 1158-59. For an in-depth description of peerto-peer networks, see PEER TO PEER COMPUTING: THE EVOLUTION OF A DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 1-113 (Ramesh Subramanian & Brian D. Goodman eds., 2005).

For a concise introduction to peer-to-peer networks, see Yochai Benkler, Coase's
Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 396-400 (2002).
159 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1012.
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(and still do occur) with no material involvement of the original
software producers.1 6 °
The increased decentralization of technology has severe implications on the effectiveness of intermediary liability. In the
words of the court of appeals: "If either Defendant closed their
doors and deactivated all computers within their control, users of
their products could continue sharing files with little or no interruption." '6 t If lower courts apply the Supreme Court's holding
and convict Grokster and StreamCast for copyright infringements, the products will remain functional despite the bankruptcy of the producers. In the digital realm, the technological
life cycle of products thus extends beyond the legal life of the
technology. In this sense, products lead an existence of their
own. This creates problems of accountability unless producers
can be deterred from creating such products in the first place.
The effectiveness or desirability of such ex ante measures, however, is doubtful. Most obviously, the (negative or positive) social value of new inventions cannot be predicted beforehand. 6 2
C. Circumventing Creativity
Technological innovation is particularly apt at evading and defeating the purposes of legislation and precedent. Whenever legislation or precedent provides specific language that includes new
technology in the copyright statute, technological innovators develop novel applications that exploit the gaps between technological possibilities and the self-described boundaries of law. Such
interaction between law and technology can perhaps best be
compared to the adaptation of creative tax consultants to the Internal Revenue Service. 163 For instance, when peer-to-peer
160 "Defendants distribute and support software, the users of which can and do
choose to employ it for both lawful and unlawful ends. Grokster and StreamCast
are not significantly different from companies that sell home video recorders or copy
machines, both of which can be and are used to infringe copyrights." Grokster I,
259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1043 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
161 Id. at 1041..

162 It is unduly hard to predict inventions in advance or to estimate the value of
inventions with some degree of success. See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property
Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV.

75, 86 n.41 (1994). "The computer was regarded by its inventors as a purely scientific device ....

Id. (citing NATHAN ROSENBERG, EXPLORING THE BLACK Box:
TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMICS AND HISTORY 220 (1994)).

163 A similar understanding of the dynamic nature of innovation can be found in
Professor Wu's description of the relation between code and law: "The programmer
is not unlike the tax lawyer, exploiting differences between stated goals of the law,
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products seemed defeated after Napster, file-sharing activities
turned to newly developed, decentralized but functionally
equivalent peer-to-peer platforms. The creativity of software developers ensures the steady supply of alternatives that circumvent outlawed technologies.' 6 4 Today, we are witnessing a shift
from high profile peer-to-peer networks to alternative, decentralized means of file swapping, ranging from novel peer-to-peer net165
works to technological advances such as "M2M" applications.
Because of the dynamics of innovative processes, copyright enforcement is a continuous, adaptive struggle that provides highly
imperfect copyright protection.
D. Production Function of Peer-to-PeerApplications
Another pervasive accountability problem is that many
software applications, unlike hardware products, are the result of
noncommercial endeavors by assorted individuals. When Grokster appeared before the Supreme Court,1 66 many were concerned with the possibility that file-sharing applications would be
excluded from a fair use defense (as this defense was defined in
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios (Sony Betamax)1 6 7
for technologies with substantial noninfringing uses).' 6 8 Such
fears, however, were overstated from the beginning. The analogy
between Sony Betamax and Grokster falls short because of the
differing nature of the technologies at issue. In contrast to hardware applications (such as VCRs), many successful softwarebased applications do not involve significant fixed investments
such as traditional marketing or distribution. Because the main
capital resource is human capital, the programming talent of one
and its legal or practical limits. He targets specific weaknesses in legal regimes ....
Wu, supra note 8, at 682.
164 Such technological warfare (the so-called "arms race") leads to an endless series of court battles. See supra Part IV.C.
165 "The term M2M represents a number of different types of communication:
machine-to-machine, machine-to-man, man-to-machine, machine-to-mobile, and
mobile-to-machine; it involves the process of giving machines, devices, and appliances the ability to share information with backoffice information systems and the
people who use them." See M2M Magazine Information, M2M MAGAZINE, http://
www.m2mmag.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
166 Oral arguments in Grokster III were held on March 29, 2005. Transcript of
Oral Argument, Grokster I1, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005), available at http://
www.sims.berkeley.edu/academics/courses/is296a-2/sO5/pdf/GroksterOA.pdf.
167 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
168 In Sony Betamax, the Supreme Court protected time shifting of television recordings as fair use. Id. at 456.
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individual can be sufficient to bring such technology to life.16 9
As the enormous success of Napster illustrated, word of mouth
and the free flow of information in cyberspace can be sufficient
to launch a novel application. Moreover, the open source nature
of much software further reduces the role of creators of peer-topeer applications as intermediaries that can be held accountable
by law.' ° Peer production is based on social motivations, reputation, and informal relationships. In these user-driven innovation environments, 7 1 the absence of a central, hierarchical
residual claimant complicates the case for liability on commercial
intermediaries.
E.

Full Circle with Circumvention Protection

In sum, new technology increasingly provides decentralized,
consumer-to-consumer dissemination of copyrighted content.
This evolution decreases the role of commercial intermediaries.
The extent and quantity of these decentralized, consumer-to-consumer exchanges has led the entertainment industry to take aim
at direct infringers and individual users of peer-to-peer file-sharing programs. Even in the wake of the Supreme Court decision
in Grokster, the decentralized, quasi-anonymous production and
distribution of peer-to-peer technology makes it unlikely that legal measures can block such technology from appearing on the
computers of private individuals.
If Congress were to enact a new law that rendered file-sharing
applications illegal, this would have a similar effect to the prohibition of circumvention technology in the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA). 2 Just as the DMCA's prohibition on
the use and production of circumvention technology did not put
an end to this technology, a prohibition on file-sharing technol169 See, for instance, how college dropout Shawn Fanning created Napster, Karl
Taro Greenfeld, Meet the Napster, CNN.coM, Sept. 25, 2000, available at http://
www.cnn.comIALLPOLITICS/time/2000/10/02/napster.html, or how the first decentralized network, Gnutella, came together as a collaborative effort of independent
open-source programmers, Janelle Brown, The Gnutella Paradox, SALON.COM, Sept.
29, 2000, http://salon.com/tech/feature/200/09/29/ gnutella-paradox/index.html.
170 For instance, the open-source technology revolution introduces a new, less
centralized perspective on the theory of the firm. See Benkler, supra note 158, at
403.
171 Eric von Hippel, Innovation by User Communities: Learning from Open-

Source Software, 42

SLOAN

MGMT.

REV.

82

(2001),

sloanreview.mit.edu/smr/issue/2001/summer/8.
172 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000).
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ogy is not likely to wipe out peer-to-peer applications. As the
district court noted in Grokster, decentralized software is of such

a nature that, for instance with regard to the Grokster and
StreamCast technologies, closing the offices of those companies
173 If postwould hardly affect the operation of their networks.
Grokster copyright enforcement then turns to users of the illegal
technology instead of producers, we will have come full circle to

the litigation of private copiers: they can now be accused on an
additional ground (the use of illegal technology) on top of any

direct copyright infringement itself. This effectively would bring
us back to the issue of litigating individual copyright
infringers
174
complications.
norm
social
accompanying
and the
CONCLUSION

The conflict between litigation and social norms sets the stage
for today's highly polarized copyright law debate. 175 As Justice
Souter indicated in Grokster, "the ease of copying songs or movies using software . . . is fostering 'disdain for copyright protection. '
Because new technology offers unprecedented
opportunities for cultural exchange, many individuals share a belief that file swapping should be legal.
Drawing on socio-psychological literature and new data, we

examined the impact of copyright litigation and the interaction
between copyright norms and enforcement. The precise effect of

raising copyright awareness through litigation is ambiguous. Litigation informs individuals of the possible dangers of sharing files,
but at the same time, lawsuits increase the perception that others
are downloading music. If enforcement is to be effective, it
needs to differentiate between experienced users of file-sharing
applications and individuals who have not yet engaged in file
173 Even if Grokster and StreamCast "closed their doors and deactivated all computers within their control, users of their products could continue sharing files with
little or no interruption." Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1041 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
174 See supra Part III.
175 Copyright scholars refer to the current climate with terms such as the "copyright war," the "copyright divide," or similar variants thereof. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & EN. L. 337 (2002) (arguing that current
copyright law is not adequate to deal with individual copyright infringements); Peter
K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDozo L. REV. 331 (2003) (arguing that copyright stakeholders are alientating nonstakeholders with strong-armed tactics); Peter
K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907 (2004) (providing a
critical discussion of the various strategies used in the entertainment industry's attempt to combat digital pircacy).
176 Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2775 (2005).
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sharing. Students who are inexperienced with peer-to-peer networks are more amenable to procopyright viewpoints because
they have not yet adopted a strong aversion to copyright
enforcement.
Policymakers should take note of the pervasiveness of the anticopyright norms of experienced file sharers when considering
recent proposals to criminalize noncommercial copyright infringements. 7 7 As illustrated in Part III, anticopyright norms of
present users of peer-to-peer technology cannot be unraveled
through enforcement. In a regime of severe sanctions, users of
file-sharing technology become more anticopyright and resort to
more downloading whenever enforcement is temporarily suspended. Such norm effects are particularly relevant in the context of copyright law because technological changes and
copyright-circumvention technology inevitably create lapses in
copyright enforcement.
The inability of litigation to deter file sharing has increased the
reliance on self-help and investments in encryption technology
and other digital rights management tools, adding to the escalating social costs of the technological arms race between content
producers and hackers. Self-help measures further engender the
impression that content owners are unduly extending copyright
capture beyond constitutional limits. 1 78 As a result, any legislative consensus becomes a hard-fought battle. By the time authors, consumer advocacy groups, producers of consumer
electronics, and publishers sit together, the atmosphere is tense
and opinions widely differ. 179 The lack of a consensus on the In177 See supra Part IV.A.
178 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998) (validating electronic private ordering but arguing that Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code shifts the burden of initiating
litigation to the licensee, who in many cases will be poorly equipped to bear it, and
should be invalidated via principles of preemption and freedom of speech); Niva
Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace-Rights Without Laws?, 73 CHI.-KENT. L.

REV. 1155 (1998) (discussing that online technology allows copyright holders to create new exclusive rights in information goods); Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware:
Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025 (1998) (stating that content holders tend to create formal private property rights that exceed the
public rights provided by the Copyright Act). For a critique on the first, see David.
E. Friedman, In Defense of Private Orderings: Comments on Julie Cohen's "Copyright and the Jurisprudenceof Self-Help", 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1151 (1998) (ar-

guing that freedom of contract and the technologies of digital monitoring and selfenforcement allow producers to better create legally adequate contracts in a mass
market context).
179 After hosting a recent one-day symposium with various representatives of
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duce Act, 18° which attempts to resolve some of the legal issues
surrounding digital music exchanges, illustrates the difficulty that
Congress will face as it attempts to resolve an oft-postponed matter that has increasingly polarized the constituencies involved.' 8s
Copyright has a long history of regulatory compromise that
removes control of access in such polarized settings. In emphasizing the limits of enforcement through litigation of commercial
intermediaries and direct infringers, this Article provides further
support to the recent proposal to introduce collective licensing
schemes to address massive copyright noncompliance.' 8 2

these constituencies, Adam Thierer, the Cato Institute's Director of Telecommunications Studies, commented that "both sides seemed as far apart as ever" and that
"there are just some copyright issues where compromise proves impossible" no matter "how long you lock everyone in a room and tell them to try to strike a deal."
Michael Grebb, Toe-to-Toe Over Peer-to-Peer, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 21, 2004, http://
www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,65414,00.html.
180 Despite preliminary approvals by the House and Senate on several proposals,
no antipiracy law was enacted before the congressional recess in fall 2004. The lack
of political consensus is widely attributed to extensive lobbying on both sides. See
Jon Healey, Bills to Thwart Piracy Falter, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at Cl.
181 See sources cited supra note 10. This is not a new phenomenon. Other occurrences of hard-fought legislative battles over the copyright law approach to new
technology include the tension in Congress over the impact of piano rolls on sheet
music and the impact of recording technology on music. For an overview, see I.
Trotter Hardy, Project Looking Forward: Sketching the Future of Copyright in a
Networked World (1998), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/thardy.pdf.
182 See supra Part V.
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APPENDIX
TRY TO IMAGINE WHAT YOU WOULD DO IN THE FOLLOWING
SITUATION.

YOUR INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES WILL
BE ANONYMOUS.

PART 1183

Have you ever downloaded music from the Internet using filesharing technology?
YES
NO
If so, how many songs have you downloaded?
songs
Many individuals download music from the Internet. By using
software programs such as Napster, Soulseek, and Kazaa, individuals share music files online. One could say that file sharing
facilitates cultural exchange. On the other hand, the music industry's revenues might reduce substantially due to file sharing.
Certainly, if artists and record labels were to receive money for
each song shared on the Internet, their revenues would be
higher. For this reason, the music industry has filed a number of
lawsuits, demanding monetary compensation from individuals
suspected of illegal downloading.
To date, by monitoring traffic on the Internet, the music industry has succeeded in identifying and initiating lawsuits against
only a small minority of suspected file sharers. The chances of
getting caught for file sharing will increase, however, because of
new technological developments and safety measures. Currently,
only 1 out of every 100,000 (0.001%) file sharers is known to the
industry. With the new technology, the chances of getting caught
will increase strongly (slightly) to 1 in 5 (20%) (1 in 10,000
(0.01%)).
The music industry's current policy is to seek compensatory
damages from suspected downloaders. According to Antibizan American organization that supports the free distribution of
music-the music industry demands sizable amounts from individuals for each "proven" downloaded file. The music industry
has announced that it will continue this policy because it deters
people from file sharing. The industry currently demands 20
(2000) euros per downloaded music file or song. Imagine that
183 The text of the alternative scenario for Part 1 of our study is in italics.
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the chances of getting caught for each downloaded song increases
to 20% (0.01%) and that if you are caught, you will have to pay
20 (2000) euros for each downloaded song or file. Given these
developments, will you still download music in the future?
Circle
Circle
Circle
Circle
Circle
Circle
Circle

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

if you
if you
if you
if you
if you
if you
if you

strongly disagree.
do not agree.
disagree but only slightly.
do not agree nor disagree.
agree but only slightly.
agree.
strongly agree.

Most people will continue to take the risks
involved with file sharing

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

These new developments are gradually making
me realize that illegally downloading music is
not ethical

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I am of the opinion that the music industry is
conducting an unjust, disproportionate policy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

The policies of the music industry conflict with
my sense of justice

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

The policies of the music industry are an attack
on my freedom to listen to music

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Developments are causing me to adjust my
norms regarding the illegal exchanges of music

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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PART II
Currently, a number of young computer experts are developing new file-sharing technology that cannot be traced. Due to
this technology, it will be very hard for the music industry to detect and identify individuals who share music. In other words,
the likelihood of getting caught will be reduced to 0.001% (1 in
100,000 file sharers). This new program will be introduced at the
start of 2006. What will you do in this "new situation" when the
likelihood of getting caught is reduced to 0.001% and the music
industry continues its current policy of pursuing file sharing?
Circle
Circle
Circle
Circle
Circle
Circle
Circle

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

if you
if you
if you
if you
if you
if you
if you

strongly disagree.
do not agree.
disagree but only slightly.
do not agree nor disagree.
agree but only slightly.
agree.
strongly agree.

2

The enforcement policy of the music industry
prior to the introduction of the new protective
software influences the amount of music I will
resume downloading

1

2

Thank you for your cooperation!
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